cs.CR
ActiveFlowMark: Assessing Tor Anonymity under Active Bandwidth Watermarking
May 7, 2026
This paper introduces an active traffic analysis method (NATA) and a deep learning framework (BM-Net) to demonstrate that bandwidth perturbations can be used by an adversary to correlate and de-anonymize Tor traffic flows.
Low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor remain vulnerable to infrastructure-level traffic analysis that exploits side-channel information observable from encrypted communications. We introduce NATA, a non-invasive active traffic-correlation analysis algorithm that injects distinguishable throughput patterns into traffic flows through controlled bandwidth perturbations. Unlike passive correlation methods, NATA does not require endpoint compromise, Tor-browser modification, or packet-payload decryption or modification. It can be carried out by an adversary that controls an upstream network gateway and observes traffic at adversary-controlled exit relays. To identify perturbed flows under substantial network variability, we develop BM-Net (Bandwidth Modulation Network), a selective state-space learning framework adapted for bandwidth-modulation detection. Given the limited availability of high-fidelity ground truth on real-world cross-continental Tor paths, BM-Net adopts a data-efficient learning strategy that separates self-supervised representation learning from supervised task-specific classification. It first learns reusable traffic representations through masked pre-training on serialized traffic traces, and then adapts these representations to binary perturbation detection and fine-grained modulation classification using task-specific labeled data. Through real Tor traffic measurements, BM-Net achieves a 99.65% binary detection F1 score and a 97.5% macro-F1 score for fine-grained modulation classification under our evaluated settings. In addition, tornettools-based scaled simulations are used to estimate exit-observation probability under bandwidth-weighted relay selection. These results suggest that active bandwidth perturbation can serve as an infrastructure-level side channel for traffic correlation under a clearly defined adversary model.