Subjective Valuations Make It Hard to be Fair: The Complexity of Resource Allocation to Groups of Agents
This paper studies the parameterized complexity of finding an EF1 allocation of indivisible items in the group-sharing setting.
This paper provides a more nuanced understanding of the parameterized complexity of EF1 allocation in the group-sharing setting, which is a novel contribution compared to prior work.
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Applications
- →Fair division
- →Resource allocation
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- Parameterized complexityfind papers →
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Abstract
More Like ThisWe study the parameterized complexity of finding an EF1 allocation of indivisible items in the group-sharing setting, which has received increasing attention in recent years. There, items are not allocated to individual agents but rather to one of two (or possibly more) groups, and agents within that group all share the assigned items. We consider both the "fixed" (EF1-Fix) and "variable" (EF1-Var) group cases, where in the former the assignments of agents to groups are prescribed. While both are NP-hard in the classical sense, we show that their algorithmic behavior differs significantly from the parameterized perspective. As our main results, we: (1) prove that both cases are NP-hard even when the number of agents is a small constant; (2) circumvent this hardness by establishing fixed-parameter tractability for EF1-Var w.r.t. the number of "subjective" items, that is, items which are viewed as chores or goods by different agents---but rule out an analogous result for EF1-Fix; and (3) establish fixed-parameter tractability for EF1-Fix w.r.t. the number of item types, but link the existence of an analogous fixed-parameter algorithm for EF1-Var to a fundamental open question in the setting of Integer Linear Programming.