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~ similar to 2603.28166v2· 20 results

cs.CRRecentMay 25, 2026

AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents

Faruk Alpay, Taylan Alpay

The paper introduces AgentSecBench, a security evaluation framework that measures prompt injection, privacy leakage, and tool-use integrity in LLM agents by defining formal security games and testing…

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cs.CRRecentApr 27, 2026

AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization

Zonghao Ying, Haozheng Wang, Jiangfan Liu, Quanchen Zou +4 more

AgentVisor is a novel defense framework that uses semantic virtualization, inspired by OS principles, to significantly reduce LLM agent vulnerability to prompt injection while maintaining high utility…

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cs.CRRecentMay 14, 2026

Toward Securing AI Agents Like Operating Systems

Lukas Pirch, Micha Horlboge, Patrick Großmann, Syeda Mahnur Asif +3 more

This paper analyzes the security of LLM-based autonomous agents by drawing parallels to operating system security, finding that while some vulnerabilities are inherent, many can be mitigated using est…

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cs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

AgentGuard: An Attribute-Based Access Control Framework for Tool-Use LLM-Based Agent

Jiaqi Luo, Songyang Peng, Jiarun Dai, Zhile Chen +5 more

AgentGuard is an attribute-based access control framework designed to mitigate severe security risks, such as privacy leakage and system compromise, in tool-using LLM-based agents.

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cs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

SkillScope: Toward Fine-Grained Least-Privilege Enforcement for Agent Skills

Jiangrong Wu, Yuhong Nan, Yixi Lin, Huaijin Wang +3 more

SkillScope introduces a graph-based framework to enforce fine-grained least-privilege in LLM Agent Skills, significantly reducing over-privileged actions while maintaining task functionality.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 18, 2026

Prompts Don't Protect: Architectural Enforcement via MCP Proxy for LLM Tool Access Control

Rohith Uppala

The paper proposes an architectural proxy (MCP) to enforce robust, reliable tool access control for LLM agents, demonstrating that this structural enforcement is necessary because prompt-based restric…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

This paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a dynamic defense mechanism that traces and sanitizes untrusted control content i…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

The paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a defense mechanism that detects and sanitizes backdoor content planted across mul…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 10, 2026

The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agents

Baoyuan Wu, Qingshan Liu, Adel Bibi, Irwin King +1 more

The paper argues that the Authorization-Execution Gap (AEG)—the divergence between intended authorization and actual execution—is a critical safety and security flaw in open-world agents, requiring so…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 4, 2026

When Agents Handle Secrets: A Survey of Confidential Computing for Agentic AI

Javad Forough, Marios Kogias, Hamed Haddadi

This survey analyzes the unique security threats posed by complex, multi-agent AI systems and proposes Confidential Computing (CC) using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a hardware-rooted defe…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 26, 2026

Lessons from Penetration Tests on Large-Scale Agent Systems

Kevin Eykholt, Dhilung Kirat, Xiaokui Shu, Jiyong Jang +2 more

The paper reports on penetration tests conducted on proprietary, large-scale AI agent systems, finding that security vulnerabilities persist despite stricter development standards.

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cs.CRRecentApr 23, 2026

Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study

Zihan Wang, Rui Zhang, Yu Liu, Chi Liu +3 more

This paper presents the first systematic study of black-box skill stealing attacks against proprietary LLM agents, demonstrating that structured agent skills can be easily extracted, posing a signific…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 19, 2026

A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security

Vincent Siu, Jingxuan He, Kyle Montgomery, Zhun Wang +3 more

The paper introduces a contextual security framework for LLM agents, defining security properties and reformulating various attacks and defenses based on the context of execution.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 7, 2026

PragLocker: Protecting Agent Intellectual Property in Untrusted Deployments via Non-Portable Prompts

Qinfeng Li, Yuntai Bao, Jianghui Hu, Wenqi Zhang +4 more

PragLocker is a novel prompt protection scheme that secures valuable LLM agent prompts against theft and reuse by other proprietary models by making them non-portable.

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cs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI -- Tools, and Autonomy

Ali Dehghantanha, Sajad Homayoun

This paper systematically maps the expanded attack surface of agentic AI systems, identifying new threat vectors like RAG poisoning and cross-agent manipulation, and proposes a comprehensive security…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 18, 2026

Post-Training Local LLM Agents for Linux Privilege Escalation with Verifiable Rewards

Philipp Normann, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Daniel Arp

The paper proposes a two-stage post-training pipeline to create a small, local LLM agent (PrivEsc-LLM) capable of performing Linux privilege escalation, achieving high success rates while drastically…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 14, 2026

Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?

Zheng Yan, Jingxiang Weng, Charles Chen, Dengyun Peng +8 more

The paper introduces a new benchmark and decomposition method, Sufficiency-Tightness Decomposition, demonstrating that current coding agents struggle to accurately infer least-privilege authorization,…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentJun 2, 2026

SkillGuard: A Permission Framework for Agent Skills

Shidong Pan, Xiaoyu Sun, Tianyi Zhang, Dianshu Liao +2 more

SkillGuard introduces a novel, skill-centric permission framework to secure LLM agent skill ecosystems by jointly regulating both context influence and runtime action side effects.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 27, 2026

SUDP: Secret-Use Delegation Protocol for Agentic Systems

Xiaohang Yu, Hejia Geng, Xinmeng Zeng, William Knottenbelt

The paper proposes the Secret-Use Delegation Protocol (SUDP) to solve the Agent Secret Use (ASU) problem, ensuring that autonomous agents can perform user-authorized operations without gaining reusabl…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 26, 2026

ChainCaps: Composition-Safe Tool-Using Agents via Monotonic Capability Attenuation

Xiaochong Jiang, Shiqi Yang, Ziwei Li, Lifei Liu +2 more

ChainCaps introduces a novel runtime capability budgeting system that prevents 'permission laundering' in complex tool-using agents, significantly reducing attack success rates while maintaining benig…

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