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~ similar to 2604.21308v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIRecentJun 2, 2026

Need to Know: Contextual-Integrity-Grounded Query Rewriting for Privacy-Conscious LLM Delegation

Xinyue Huang, Xiaochun Cao, Wenyuan Yang

The paper introduces a Contextual Integrity (CI) framework and a new benchmark (DelegateCI-Bench) to rewrite user queries sent to cloud LLMs, ensuring only task-essential information is retained while…

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cs.LGcs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 18, 2026

It Takes Two: Complementary Self-Distillation for Contextual Integrity in LLMs

Sangwoo Park, Woongyeong Yeo, Seanie Lee, Yumin Choi +5 more

The paper proposes SELFCI, a complementary self-distillation framework that effectively balances the privacy requirements of Contextual Integrity (CI) with the utility of large language models, outper…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 19, 2026

A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security

Vincent Siu, Jingxuan He, Kyle Montgomery, Zhun Wang +3 more

The paper introduces a contextual security framework for LLM agents, defining security properties and reformulating various attacks and defenses based on the context of execution.

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cs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

Profiling for Pennies: Unveiling the Privacy Iceberg of LLM Agents

Jiahao Chen, Qi Zhang, Ruixiao Lin, Chunyi Zhou +6 more

The paper introduces the PrivacyIceberg framework to systematically categorize and empirically demonstrate the high risk of automated, deep personal profiling using LLM agents, revealing a significant…

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cs.CRRecentMay 25, 2026

AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents

Faruk Alpay, Taylan Alpay

The paper introduces AgentSecBench, a security evaluation framework that measures prompt injection, privacy leakage, and tool-use integrity in LLM agents by defining formal security games and testing…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.CYRecentMay 17, 2026

AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injections

Sahar Abdelnabi, Eugene Bagdasarian

The paper argues that prompt injection is a fundamental vulnerability in AI agents, proposing that Contextual Integrity (CI) offers a principled framework to understand and mitigate context-sensitive…

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cs.AIRecentJun 1, 2026

MCP-Persona: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Real-World Personal Applications via Environment Simulation

Wenhao Wang, Peizhi Niu, Gongyi Zou, Xiyuan Yang +8 more

The paper introduces MCP-Persona, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate LLM agents' performance on real-world, personalized applications using the Model Context Protocol (MCP), revealing that current…

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cs.CRRecentMay 9, 2026

When LLMs Team Up: A Coordinated Attack Framework for Automated Cyber Intrusions

Minfeng Qi, Tianqing Zhu, Zijie Xu, Congcong Zhu +2 more

The paper introduces CAESAR, a novel multi-agent framework that coordinates LLM agents across five specialized roles to improve success rates and stability in complex, multi-stage cyber intrusion task…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 22, 2026

When the Manual Lies: A Realistic Benchmark to Evaluate MCP Poisoning Attacks for LLM Agents

Shi Liu, Xuehai Tang, Xikang Yang, Liang Lin +3 more

This paper introduces a new benchmark to test Tool Description Poisoning (TDP) attacks on LLM agents, demonstrating that even advanced models like GPT-4o are highly vulnerable and that current defense…

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cs.AIRecentMay 29, 2026

LLM-FACETS: A Privacy-Preserving Framework for Evaluating LLM Transparency and Accountability

Tom Lucas, Alessio Buscemi, Alfredo Capozucca, German Castignani +1 more

LLM-FACETS introduces an open-source, privacy-preserving framework designed to enable non-technical domain experts and compliance officers to audit and evaluate the transparency and accountability of…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 7, 2026

Your LLM Agent Can Leak Your Data: Data Exfiltration via Backdoored Tool Use

Wuyang Zhang, Shichao Pei

This paper introduces Back-Reveal, an attack demonstrating that backdoored LLM agents can systematically exfiltrate sensitive user data by embedding semantic triggers into tool-use mechanisms.

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cs.AIRecentMay 27, 2026

Harness-Bench: Measuring Harness Effects across Models in Realistic Agent Workflows

Yilun Yao, Xinyu Tan, Chao-Hsuan Liu, Yaoming Li +8 more

The paper introduces Harness-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark that measures how different system 'harnesses' affect LLM agent performance in realistic workflows, showing that agent capability must be rep…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 5, 2026

ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injection

Shihao Weng, Yang Feng, Jinrui Zhang, Xiaofei Xie +2 more

The paper introduces ARGUS, a defense mechanism that uses provenance-aware decision auditing to protect LLM agents from sophisticated, context-aware prompt injection attacks, significantly reducing th…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 17, 2026

Context Matters: Repository-Aware Security Analysis of the Agent Skill Ecosystem

Florian Holzbauer, David Schmidt, Gabriel Gegenhuber, Sebastian Schrittwieser +1 more

This paper conducts a large-scale, repository-aware security analysis of AI agent skills, demonstrating that incorporating surrounding project context drastically reduces the rate of false positive ma…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 29, 2026

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

Mingxuan Zhang, Jiahui Han, Dadi Guo, Songze Li +4 more

The paper introduces PrivacyPeek, a new benchmark that audits the acquisition stage of LLM-based agents to demonstrate that unnecessary acquisition of sensitive data is a widespread and critical priva…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 29, 2026

PrivacyPeek: Auditing What LLM-Based Agents Acquire, Not Just What They Say

Mingxuan Zhang, Jiahui Han, Dadi Guo, Songze Li +4 more

The paper introduces PrivacyPeek, a new benchmark that audits the acquisition stage of LLM-based agents to show that unnecessary and sensitive data acquisition is a widespread and critical privacy vul…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 3, 2026

Credential Leakage in LLM Agent Skills: A Large-Scale Empirical Study

Zhihao Chen, Ying Zhang, Yi Liu, Gelei Deng +6 more

This study conducts a large-scale empirical analysis of third-party LLM agent skills, identifying that credential leakage is a pervasive, cross-modal issue primarily caused by debug logging and result…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 30, 2026

Privacy Guard & Token Parsimony by Prompt and Context Handling and LLM Routing

Alessio Langiu

The paper introduces a 'Privacy Guard' framework that simultaneously reduces operational costs and eliminates data leakage risks when using LLMs by optimizing prompts and routing queries to secure mod…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 28, 2026

From CRUD to Autonomous Agents: Formal Validation and Zero-Trust Security for Semantic Gateways in AI-Native Enterprise Systems

Ignacio Peyrano

The paper proposes a Semantic Gateway and a Zero-Trust security model to formally validate and secure autonomous AI agents operating in enterprise systems, achieving a 100% discovery rate of unauthori…

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cs.CRRecentApr 23, 2026

Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study

Zihan Wang, Rui Zhang, Yu Liu, Chi Liu +3 more

This paper presents the first systematic study of black-box skill stealing attacks against proprietary LLM agents, demonstrating that structured agent skills can be easily extracted, posing a signific…

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