ArXivCSExplorer
☆☆Bookmarks🏆RSSHow to UseFAQ
Built with and by Teycir Ben Soltane•
How to Use•FAQ•GitHub•arXiv.org•
Share:

~ similar to 2604.27143v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 18, 2026

Post-Training Local LLM Agents for Linux Privilege Escalation with Verifiable Rewards

Philipp Normann, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, Daniel Arp

The paper proposes a two-stage post-training pipeline to create a small, local LLM agent (PrivEsc-LLM) capable of performing Linux privilege escalation, achieving high success rates while drastically…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 6, 2026

Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities

Charafeddine Mouzouni

The paper systematically maps LLM agent vulnerabilities by testing 10,000 prompt variations, finding that 'goal reframing' language is the primary trigger for exploitation, rather than broad adversari…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and success rate of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation capabilit…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and effectiveness of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation rates am…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 28, 2026

Honeyval: A Comprehensive Evaluation Framework for LLM-powered HTTP Honeypots

Mark Vero, Fabian Kaczmarczyck, Ivan Petrov, Ilia Shumailov +5 more

The paper introduces Honeyval, a comprehensive evaluation framework, to rigorously test LLM-powered HTTP honeypots, demonstrating that these honeypots provide substantially longer and harder-to-detect…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 28, 2026

Honeyval: A Comprehensive Evaluation Framework for LLM-powered HTTP Honeypots

Mark Vero, Fabian Kaczmarczyck, Ivan Petrov, Ilia Shumailov +5 more

The paper introduces Honeyval, a comprehensive evaluation framework, to rigorously test LLM-powered HTTP honeypots, demonstrating that these systems provide substantially longer and harder-to-detect i…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 17, 2026

Security Assessment and Mitigation Strategies for Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Defensive Framework

Taiwo Onitiju, Iman Vakilinia

The paper establishes a standardized security assessment framework and develops a multi-layered defensive system, demonstrating that systematic testing and external defenses are crucial for safe LLM d…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 13, 2026

ExploitBench: A Capability Ladder Benchmark for LLM Cybersecurity Agents

Seunghyun Lee, David Brumley

The paper introduces ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that measures the progressive stages of exploitation, demonstrating that while current frontier models can easily trigger bugs, achievi…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

This paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a dynamic defense mechanism that traces and sanitizes untrusted control content i…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

The paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a defense mechanism that detects and sanitizes backdoor content planted across mul…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 1, 2026

Automated Framework to Evaluate and Harden LLM System Instructions against Encoding Attacks

Anubhab Sahu, Diptisha Samanta, Reza Soosahabi

The paper introduces an automated framework demonstrating that LLM system instructions are vulnerable to encoding attacks, where structured output requests can bypass safety refusals and leak sensitiv…

View →
cs.CRRecentApr 19, 2026

GuardPhish: Securing Open-Source LLMs from Phishing Abuse

Rina Mishra, Gaurav Varshney, Doddipatla Sesha Sahithi

The paper introduces GuardPhish, a large-scale dataset and evaluation framework, demonstrating that even high-performing open-source LLMs can generate actionable phishing content despite accurate inte…

View →
cs.CRRecentApr 13, 2026

Towards Automated Pentesting with Large Language Models

Ricardo Bessa, Rui Claro, João Trindade, João Lourenço

The paper introduces RedShell, a hardware-efficient framework that uses fine-tuned LLMs to automate the generation of syntactically and semantically valid offensive PowerShell code for pentesting.

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentApr 7, 2026

Hackers or Hallucinators? A Comprehensive Analysis of LLM-Based Automated Penetration Testing

Jiaren Peng, Zeqin Li, Chang You, Yan Wang +16 more

This paper provides the first comprehensive systematization and large-scale empirical evaluation of existing LLM-based Automated Penetration Testing (AutoPT) frameworks, offering a structured taxonomy…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 7, 2026

PragLocker: Protecting Agent Intellectual Property in Untrusted Deployments via Non-Portable Prompts

Qinfeng Li, Yuntai Bao, Jianghui Hu, Wenqi Zhang +4 more

PragLocker is a novel prompt protection scheme that secures valuable LLM agent prompts against theft and reuse by other proprietary models by making them non-portable.

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 14, 2026

Toward Securing AI Agents Like Operating Systems

Lukas Pirch, Micha Horlboge, Patrick Großmann, Syeda Mahnur Asif +3 more

This paper analyzes the security of LLM-based autonomous agents by drawing parallels to operating system security, finding that while some vulnerabilities are inherent, many can be mitigated using est…

View →
cs.CRRecentMar 18, 2026

LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems

Hammad Atta, Ken Huang, Kyriakos Rock Lambros, Yasir Mehmood +10 more

The paper introduces LAAF, a novel automated red-teaming framework, to systematically test and exploit Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI) vulnerabilities in complex agentic LLM systems.

View →
cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 29, 2026

A Security Analysis of the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

Surada Suwansathit, Yuxuan Zhang, Guofei Gu

This paper analyzes 470 security advisories in the OpenClaw AI agent framework, demonstrating that the system's structural weakness lies in per-layer trust enforcement, enabling cross-layer remote cod…

View →
cs.CRRecentMar 30, 2026

Attesting LLM Pipelines: Enforcing Verifiable Training and Release Claims

Zhuoran Tan, Jeremy Singer, Christos Anagnostopoulos

The paper proposes an attestation-aware promotion gate to mitigate supply-chain risks in LLM pipelines by cryptographically verifying and enforcing claims about training and release artifacts before d…

View →
cs.CRRecentApr 23, 2026

Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study

Zihan Wang, Rui Zhang, Yu Liu, Chi Liu +3 more

This paper presents the first systematic study of black-box skill stealing attacks against proprietary LLM agents, demonstrating that structured agent skills can be easily extracted, posing a signific…

View →