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~ similar to 2605.03179v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.CLcs.LGRecentMay 27, 2026

Code as a Weapon: A Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a large, consensus-labeled prompt bank that reliably distinguishes between requests for executable malicious code and requests for harmful security knowledge, providing a standard…

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cs.CRRecentMay 19, 2026

Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

This paper systematically reviews thirteen diverse malicious-code prompt corpora used to evaluate LLM refusal, identifying critical methodological gaps in current research.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

An Empirical Evaluation of LLM-Generated Code Security Across Prompting Methods

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Mohammad Hammoudeh +1 more

The paper empirically evaluates the security quality of LLM-generated code across various prompting methods, finding that while prompting alters the structure of weaknesses, it is insufficient to reli…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 5, 2026

MOSAIC-Bench: Measuring Compositional Vulnerability Induction in Coding Agents

Jonathan Steinberg, Oren Gal

The paper introduces MOSAIC-Bench, a benchmark demonstrating that coding agents can ship exploitable code by complying with seemingly innocuous, staged tasks, a vulnerability that is not easily mitiga…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

Enhancing Reliability in LLM-Based Secure Code Generation

Mohammed F. Kharma, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Ahmed Sabbah, David Mohaisen

The paper introduces the Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT) framework, which significantly enhances the security reliability of code generated by LLMs across multiple languages and models.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

Willing but Unable: Separating Refusal from Capability in Code LLMs via Abliteration

Cristina Carleo, Pietro Liguori, Naghmeh Ivaki, Domenico Cotroneo

The paper introduces 'abliteration,' a weight editing technique that successfully bypasses the refusal mechanism of safety-aligned Code LLMs, enabling scalable synthesis of vulnerable code from safe i…

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cs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

Leveraging Large Language Models for Trustworthiness Assessment of Web Applications

Oleksandr Yarotskyi, José D'Abruzzo Pereira, João R. Campos

This paper proposes an empirical methodology to automate web application trustworthiness assessment by leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to verify adherence to secure coding practices, showing t…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.CYRecentMay 8, 2026

SecureForge: Finding and Preventing Vulnerabilities in LLM-Generated Code via Prompt Optimization

Houjun Liu, Lisa Einstein, John Yang, Joachim Baumann +4 more

SecureForge is an automated pipeline that significantly reduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code by optimizing system prompts, achieving up to a 48% reduction in output vulnerabilit…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 3, 2026

An Independent Safety Evaluation of Kimi K2.5

Zheng-Xin Yong, Parv Mahajan, Andy Wang, Ida Caspary +11 more

The paper conducts a preliminary safety evaluation of the open-weight LLM Kimi K2.5, finding that while it is highly capable, it exhibits concerning dual-use risks, particularly regarding CBRNE misuse…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMar 24, 2026

Does Teaming-Up LLMs Improve Secure Code Generation? A Comprehensive Evaluation with Multi-LLMSecCodeEval

Bushra Sabir, Shigang Liu, Seung Ick Jang, Sharif Abuadbba +5 more

The paper evaluates multi-LLM strategies for secure code generation, finding that hybrid pipelines combining ensembling, static analysis, and patching achieve the strongest security performance, outpe…

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cs.CLRecentMay 28, 2026

Evaluating using Mock Tool Calls to Quarantine Untrusted Prompt Inputs

David Gros, Adam Gleave

The paper tested the hypothesis that wrapping untrusted prompt inputs in mock tool calls would improve LLM robustness, but found that this technique generally fails and can even increase vulnerability…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree, necessitating a layered governance approach for s…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree on maliciousness, necessitating layered security g…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 31, 2026

A New Framework for Cybersecurity Refusals in AI Agents

Eliot Krzysztof Jones, Mateusz Dziemian, Matt Fredrikson, J Zico Kolter

The paper introduces a novel framework to evaluate when and how AI agents should refuse harmful requests in offensive cybersecurity tasks, finding that most state-of-the-art models exhibit dangerously…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 29, 2026

How to Compare the Security of Code Written by Humans to LLM-generated Code

Rebecca Balebako, Jasmine Egl

The paper proposes an automated, standardized framework to empirically compare the security quality of code generated through human-only, LLM-only, and hybrid collaboration methods.

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 11, 2026

Usability as a Weapon: Attacking the Safety of LLM-Based Code Generation via Usability Requirements

Yue Li, Xiao Li, Hao Wu, Yue Zhang +4 more

This paper introduces UPAttack, a novel threat model demonstrating that focusing on explicit usability requirements can cause LLMs to generate insecure code by neglecting implicit security constraints…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.MARecentMar 23, 2026

STRIATUM-CTF: A Protocol-Driven Agentic Framework for General-Purpose CTF Solving

James Hugglestone, Samuel Jacob Chacko, Dawson Stoller, Ryan Schmidt +1 more

The paper introduces STRIATUM-CTF, a modular agentic framework that uses a standardized context protocol to enable LLMs to perform multi-step, stateful reasoning for general-purpose CTF solving, achie…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 17, 2026

Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applications

Isaac David, Arthur Gervais

The paper proposes Ablating Safety, a controlled protocol for removing safety alignment from language models, demonstrating that targeted de-alignment can significantly boost security performance whil…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 19, 2026

Measuring Safety Alignment Effects in Autonomous Security Agents

Isaac David, Arthur Gervais

The study evaluates how safety alignment affects autonomous security agents using a comprehensive trace-based benchmark, finding that while less-restricted models show gains, these effects are not uni…

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