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~ similar to 2605.11029v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 22, 2026

Cross-Session Threats in AI Agents: Benchmark, Evaluation, and Algorithms

Ari Azarafrooz

The paper introduces CSTM-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark and evaluation framework demonstrating that standard session-bound AI guardrails fail against sophisticated, cross-session attacks that accum…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 21, 2026

Cyber Defense Benchmark: Agentic Threat Hunting Evaluation for LLMs in SecOps

Alankrit Chona, Igor Kozlov, Ambuj Kumar

The paper introduces a challenging benchmark for LLM agents to perform unsupervised threat hunting on raw Windows event logs, finding that current frontier models perform poorly and are not ready for…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 21, 2026

Blind Spots in the Guard: How Domain-Camouflaged Injection Attacks Evade Detection in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Aaditya Pai

The paper identifies a critical vulnerability, the Camouflage Detection Gap (CDG), where standard LLM injection detectors fail dramatically when malicious payloads mimic the target domain's language a…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 12, 2026

SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces

Chang Jin, An Wang, Zeming Wei, Kai Wang +6 more

The paper introduces SkillSafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark demonstrating that agent safety failures often stem from adversarial influences within reusable skills and execution environments, rath…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

PoisonForge: Task-Level Targeted Poisoning Benchmark for Instruction-Tuned LLMs

Luze Sun, Anshuman Suri, Harsh Chaudhari, Cristina Nita-Rotaru +1 more

The paper introduces PoisonForge, a comprehensive benchmark demonstrating that even a small number of targeted poisoned examples can significantly compromise the safety and reliability of instruction-…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 8, 2026

TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories

Yen-Shan Chen, Sian-Yao Huang, Cheng-Lin Yang, Yun-Nung Chen

The paper introduces TraceSafe-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark, and finds that securing LLM agents requires jointly optimizing for structural reasoning and safety alignment to mitigate risks during m…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 4, 2026

A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a validated, consensus-labeled prompt bank that separates requests for executable malicious code (weapons) from requests for general harmful security knowledge, providing a more g…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 8, 2026

CyBiasBench: Benchmarking Bias in LLM Agents for Cyber-Attack Scenarios

Taein Lim, Seongyong Ju, Munhyeok Kim, Hyunjun Kim +1 more

The paper introduces CyBiasBench, a comprehensive benchmark that quantifies the inherent, agent-specific bias in LLM agents' attack selection patterns in cybersecurity scenarios.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 18, 2026

Be Kind, Rewrite: Benign Projections via Rewriting Defend Against LLM Data Poisoning Attacks

John T. Halloran, Noopur S. Bhatt

The paper proposes Open-Book Benign Rewriting (OBBR), a novel defense mechanism that uses LLM rewriting with benign samples to neutralize data poisoning attacks against LLMs, significantly improving s…

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cs.CRRecentMay 20, 2026

Rethinking Fraud Safety Evaluation: Multi-Round Attacks Reveal Safety-Utility Tradeoffs in Graph-Context LLM Defenders

Laura Jiang, Reza Ryan, Qian Li, Nasim Ferdosian

The paper evaluates graph-context LLM defenders against multi-round, adaptive fraud attacks, finding that while graph context improves early safety, it significantly increases benign over-refusal due…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMar 29, 2026

Evaluating Prompt Injection Defenses for Educational LLM Tutors: Security-Usability-Latency Trade-offs

Alexandre Cristovão Maiorano

The paper evaluates prompt-injection defenses for educational LLM tutors, demonstrating that optimal security requires balancing adversarial robustness, usability, and latency, and proposing a compreh…

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cs.CRRecentApr 23, 2026

MCP Pitfall Lab: Exposing Developer Pitfalls in MCP Tool Server Security under Multi-Vector Attacks

Run Hao, Zhuoran Tan

The paper introduces MCP Pitfall Lab, a comprehensive security testing framework that rigorously assesses and validates developer pitfalls in Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool servers under realistic…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 22, 2026

When the Manual Lies: A Realistic Benchmark to Evaluate MCP Poisoning Attacks for LLM Agents

Shi Liu, Xuehai Tang, Xikang Yang, Liang Lin +3 more

This paper introduces a new benchmark to test Tool Description Poisoning (TDP) attacks on LLM agents, demonstrating that even advanced models like GPT-4o are highly vulnerable and that current defense…

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cs.CRRecentMay 14, 2026

Defenses at Odds: Measuring and Explaining Defense Conflicts in Large Language Models

Xiangtao Meng, Wenyu Chen, Chuanchao Zang, Xinyu Gao +4 more

This paper systematically measures and explains how sequential model defenses can conflict, finding that 38.9% of ordered defense sequences cause measurable risk exacerbation due to anti-aligned param…

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cs.CRcs.CLRecentApr 24, 2026

Training a General Purpose Automated Red Teaming Model

Aishwarya Padmakumar, Leon Derczynski, Traian Rebedea, Christopher Parisien

The paper proposes a general-purpose pipeline to train automated red teaming models capable of generating attacks for arbitrary adversarial goals, overcoming the limitations of current methods that ar…

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cs.CRcs.CLRecentMay 14, 2026

Talk is (Not) Cheap: A Taxonomy and Benchmark Coverage Audit for LLM Attacks

Karthik Raghu Iyer, Yazdan Jamshidi, Nicholas Bray, Alexey A. Shvets

The paper introduces a comprehensive taxonomy and auditing framework to assess the collective coverage of existing LLM attack benchmarks, revealing significant and systematic gaps in current testing m…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 17, 2026

Security Assessment and Mitigation Strategies for Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Defensive Framework

Taiwo Onitiju, Iman Vakilinia

The paper establishes a standardized security assessment framework and develops a multi-layered defensive system, demonstrating that systematic testing and external defenses are crucial for safe LLM d…

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cs.CRcs.LGRecentApr 25, 2026

A Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Framework

Kexin Chu

The paper proposes the Layered Attack Surface Model (LASM), a structural taxonomy that maps security threats and defenses across the complex, multi-layered architecture of AI agents, revealing signifi…

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cs.SEcs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 30, 2026

When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems

Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Junxian You +5 more

The paper introduces SkillReact, a framework that measures compositional risk in agent skill ecosystems, finding that even if individual skills are safe, their combination can create significant, unad…

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