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~ similar to 2605.26196v1· 20 results

cs.CRRecentMar 25, 2026

Trusted-Execution Environment (TEE) for Solving the Replication Crisis in Academia

Jiasun Li, Project Team

The paper proposes using Trusted-Execution Environments (TEEs) to create a scalable, privacy-preserving system where authors can submit cryptographic proofs of correct research replication, thereby ad…

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cs.HCcs.AIcs.CRRecentApr 19, 2026

What Security and Privacy Transparency Users Need from Consumer-Facing Generative AI

Jiaxun Cao, Yu Dong, Chunxi Zhan, Rithvik Neti +2 more

The paper investigates how users perceive and utilize security and privacy transparency in consumer-facing generative AI, finding that users rely on proxies like popularity and require actionable, tru…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMay 21, 2026

Finding Missing Input Validation in TEEs via LLM-Assisted Symbolic Execution

Chengyan Ma, Jieke Shi, Ruidong Han, Ye Liu +2 more

The paper introduces SymTEE, an LLM-assisted symbolic execution framework that detects missing input validation vulnerabilities in TEE applications without needing complex, real TEE setups.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 14, 2026

Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?

Zheng Yan, Jingxiang Weng, Charles Chen, Dengyun Peng +8 more

The paper introduces a new benchmark and decomposition method, Sufficiency-Tightness Decomposition, demonstrating that current coding agents struggle to accurately infer least-privilege authorization,…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 4, 2026

A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a validated, consensus-labeled prompt bank that separates requests for executable malicious code (weapons) from requests for general harmful security knowledge, providing a more g…

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cs.HCcs.CRRecentMay 22, 2026

From Preventive to Reactive: How AI Coding Assistants Transform Developers' Security Awareness

Faisal Haque Bappy, Tahrim Hossain, Sidratul Muntaher Meheraj, Annoor Sharara Akhand +4 more

The paper investigates how AI coding assistants shift developers' security focus from proactive prevention to reactive review, finding that this structural change is reinforced by current tool interac…

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cs.CRRecentMay 20, 2026

An Evidence-driven Protocol for Trustworthy CI Pipelines

Fernando Castillo, Eduardo Brito, Pille Pullonen-Raudvere, Sebastian Werner +1 more

The paper proposes an evidence-driven protocol combining Deterministic Build Systems and Trusted Execution Environments to provide cryptographically verifiable guarantees of software artifact integrit…

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cs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

Leveraging Large Language Models for Trustworthiness Assessment of Web Applications

Oleksandr Yarotskyi, José D'Abruzzo Pereira, João R. Campos

This paper proposes an empirical methodology to automate web application trustworthiness assessment by leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to verify adherence to secure coding practices, showing t…

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cs.CLRecentMay 28, 2026

Evaluating using Mock Tool Calls to Quarantine Untrusted Prompt Inputs

David Gros, Adam Gleave

The paper tested the hypothesis that wrapping untrusted prompt inputs in mock tool calls would improve LLM robustness, but found that this technique generally fails and can even increase vulnerability…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMar 23, 2026

A Survey of Web Application Security Tutorials

Bhagya Chembakottu, Martin P. Robillard

This survey analyzed 132 web application security tutorials, finding that most lack concrete implementation details and recommending that the presence of runnable code and links to official resources…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMay 21, 2026

Automated Repair of TEE Partitioning Issues via DSL-Guided and LLM-Assisted Patching

Chengyan Ma, Jieke Shi, Ruidong Han, Ye Liu +3 more

The paper introduces TEERepair, a framework that automatically repairs severe security vulnerabilities caused by improper partitioning in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) by combining a domain-sp…

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cs.CRRecentApr 5, 2026

Styx: Collaborative and Private Data Processing With TEE-Enforced Sticky Policy

Shixuan Zhao, Weicheng Wang, Ninghui Li, Zhiqiang Lin

Styx is a novel framework that enhances data privacy and security in collaborative data processing, such as joint AI training, by integrating sticky policies with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 19, 2026

Security awareness in LLM agents: the NDAI zone case

Enrico Bottazzi, Pia Park

The paper investigates how LLM agents determine the security of their execution environment in a simulated negotiation setting, finding that while they can detect danger, they cannot reliably verify s…

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cs.CRRecentApr 29, 2026

Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Prevalence, Techniques, and Objectives

Soheil Khodayari, Xuenan Zhang, Bhupendra Acharya, Giancarlo Pellegrino

This paper provides a large-scale empirical analysis of indirect prompt injections found in webpages, revealing that prompt-based interference is a widespread, persistent, and growing threat targeting…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 17, 2026

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Zhengyang Shan, Heming Liu, Dileepa Lakshan +2 more

The paper introduces ASPI, a benchmark showing that requiring LLM agents to seek clarification significantly amplifies their vulnerability to prompt injection attacks.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

Enhancing Reliability in LLM-Based Secure Code Generation

Mohammed F. Kharma, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Ahmed Sabbah, David Mohaisen

The paper introduces the Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT) framework, which significantly enhances the security reliability of code generated by LLMs across multiple languages and models.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 26, 2026

Lessons from Penetration Tests on Large-Scale Agent Systems

Kevin Eykholt, Dhilung Kirat, Xiaokui Shu, Jiyong Jang +2 more

The paper reports on penetration tests conducted on proprietary, large-scale AI agent systems, finding that security vulnerabilities persist despite stricter development standards.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

An Empirical Evaluation of LLM-Generated Code Security Across Prompting Methods

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Mohammad Hammoudeh +1 more

The paper empirically evaluates the security quality of LLM-generated code across various prompting methods, finding that while prompting alters the structure of weaknesses, it is insufficient to reli…

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cs.CRRecentApr 18, 2026

False Security Confidence in Benign LLM Code Generation

Xiaolei Ren

The paper introduces False Security Confidence (FSC), a new metric to measure the inherent prevalence of security vulnerabilities in code generated by LLMs that are otherwise functionally correct, eve…

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cs.CRRecentMay 28, 2026

Protecting On-Device AI Inference: A Systematic Review of Attacks and Defence Mechanisms

Zisis Tsiatsikas, Alexandros Fakis, Georgios Karopoulos, Vasileios Kouliaridis +1 more

This paper provides the first comprehensive review of threats and defenses specifically targeting on-device AI inference, revealing a significant imbalance where certain attack types, like adversarial…

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