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~ similar to 2605.28734v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 4, 2026

A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a validated, consensus-labeled prompt bank that separates requests for executable malicious code (weapons) from requests for general harmful security knowledge, providing a more g…

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cs.CRRecentMay 19, 2026

Refusal Evaluation in Coding LLMs and Code Agents: A Systematic Review of Thirteen Malicious-Code Prompt Corpora (2023-2025)

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

This paper systematically reviews thirteen diverse malicious-code prompt corpora used to evaluate LLM refusal, identifying critical methodological gaps in current research.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

Willing but Unable: Separating Refusal from Capability in Code LLMs via Abliteration

Cristina Carleo, Pietro Liguori, Naghmeh Ivaki, Domenico Cotroneo

The paper introduces 'abliteration,' a weight editing technique that successfully bypasses the refusal mechanism of safety-aligned Code LLMs, enabling scalable synthesis of vulnerable code from safe i…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 5, 2026

MOSAIC-Bench: Measuring Compositional Vulnerability Induction in Coding Agents

Jonathan Steinberg, Oren Gal

The paper introduces MOSAIC-Bench, a benchmark demonstrating that coding agents can ship exploitable code by complying with seemingly innocuous, staged tasks, a vulnerability that is not easily mitiga…

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cs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

Leveraging Large Language Models for Trustworthiness Assessment of Web Applications

Oleksandr Yarotskyi, José D'Abruzzo Pereira, João R. Campos

This paper proposes an empirical methodology to automate web application trustworthiness assessment by leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to verify adherence to secure coding practices, showing t…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

An Empirical Evaluation of LLM-Generated Code Security Across Prompting Methods

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Mohammad Hammoudeh +1 more

The paper empirically evaluates the security quality of LLM-generated code across various prompting methods, finding that while prompting alters the structure of weaknesses, it is insufficient to reli…

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cs.CLRecentMay 28, 2026

Evaluating using Mock Tool Calls to Quarantine Untrusted Prompt Inputs

David Gros, Adam Gleave

The paper tested the hypothesis that wrapping untrusted prompt inputs in mock tool calls would improve LLM robustness, but found that this technique generally fails and can even increase vulnerability…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.CYRecentMay 8, 2026

SecureForge: Finding and Preventing Vulnerabilities in LLM-Generated Code via Prompt Optimization

Houjun Liu, Lisa Einstein, John Yang, Joachim Baumann +4 more

SecureForge is an automated pipeline that significantly reduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code by optimizing system prompts, achieving up to a 48% reduction in output vulnerabilit…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and success rate of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation capabilit…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and effectiveness of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation rates am…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.SERecentMay 28, 2026

Minimal Prompt Perturbations Lead to Code Vulnerabilities: Prompt Fragility and Hidden-State Signals in Coding LLMs

Alexander Sternfeld, Andrei Kucharavy, Ljiljana Dolamic

Minor, single-character perturbations to prompts can significantly degrade the security of code generated by LLMs, suggesting that prompt fragility is a major security concern beyond simple prompt inj…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 11, 2026

Usability as a Weapon: Attacking the Safety of LLM-Based Code Generation via Usability Requirements

Yue Li, Xiao Li, Hao Wu, Yue Zhang +4 more

This paper introduces UPAttack, a novel threat model demonstrating that focusing on explicit usability requirements can cause LLMs to generate insecure code by neglecting implicit security constraints…

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cs.CRRecentApr 18, 2026

False Security Confidence in Benign LLM Code Generation

Xiaolei Ren

The paper introduces False Security Confidence (FSC), a new metric to measure the inherent prevalence of security vulnerabilities in code generated by LLMs that are otherwise functionally correct, eve…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

Enhancing Reliability in LLM-Based Secure Code Generation

Mohammed F. Kharma, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Ahmed Sabbah, David Mohaisen

The paper introduces the Mitigation-Aware Chain-of-Thought (MA-CoT) framework, which significantly enhances the security reliability of code generated by LLMs across multiple languages and models.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 31, 2026

A New Framework for Cybersecurity Refusals in AI Agents

Eliot Krzysztof Jones, Mateusz Dziemian, Matt Fredrikson, J Zico Kolter

The paper introduces a novel framework to evaluate when and how AI agents should refuse harmful requests in offensive cybersecurity tasks, finding that most state-of-the-art models exhibit dangerously…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree, necessitating a layered governance approach for s…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree on maliciousness, necessitating layered security g…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 17, 2026

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Zhengyang Shan, Heming Liu, Dileepa Lakshan +2 more

The paper introduces ASPI, a benchmark showing that requiring LLM agents to seek clarification significantly amplifies their vulnerability to prompt injection attacks.

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cs.CRRecentMay 13, 2026

Do Skill Descriptions Tell the Truth? Detecting Undisclosed Security Behaviors in Code-Backed LLM Skills

Wenhui He, Yue Li, Bang Fu, Huan Xing +3 more

The paper introduces SKILLSCOPE, a system that detects security-relevant behaviors in code-backed LLM skills that are not disclosed in the natural language description, finding that 9.4% of skills exh…

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