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~ similar to 2605.30534v1· 20 results

cs.CRRecentMar 19, 2026

Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems

Md Takrim Ul Alam, Akif Islam, Mohd Ruhul Ameen, Abu Saleh Musa Miah +1 more

The paper introduces Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models LLM prompts as structured segments to intercept prompt injection attacks with high accuracy and…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 9, 2026

PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluation

Runpeng Geng, Chenlong Yin, Yanting Wang, Ying Chen +1 more

The paper introduces PIArena, a unified and extensible platform designed to address the lack of standardized evaluation for prompt injection, revealing critical limitations in current state-of-the-art…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.CYRecentMay 8, 2026

SecureForge: Finding and Preventing Vulnerabilities in LLM-Generated Code via Prompt Optimization

Houjun Liu, Lisa Einstein, John Yang, Joachim Baumann +4 more

SecureForge is an automated pipeline that significantly reduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code by optimizing system prompts, achieving up to a 48% reduction in output vulnerabilit…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.SERecentMay 28, 2026

Minimal Prompt Perturbations Lead to Code Vulnerabilities: Prompt Fragility and Hidden-State Signals in Coding LLMs

Alexander Sternfeld, Andrei Kucharavy, Ljiljana Dolamic

Minor, single-character perturbations to prompts can significantly degrade the security of code generated by LLMs, suggesting that prompt fragility is a major security concern beyond simple prompt inj…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

This paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a dynamic defense mechanism that traces and sanitizes untrusted control content i…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

The paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a defense mechanism that detects and sanitizes backdoor content planted across mul…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 18, 2026

CASCADE: A Cascaded Hybrid Defense Architecture for Prompt Injection Detection in MCP-Based Systems

İpek Abasıkeleş Turgut, Edip Gümüş

The paper proposes CASCADE, a novel three-tiered, fully local defense architecture for detecting prompt injection and tool poisoning attacks in Model Context Protocol (MCP)-based LLM systems, achievin…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMay 21, 2026

Finding Missing Input Validation in TEEs via LLM-Assisted Symbolic Execution

Chengyan Ma, Jieke Shi, Ruidong Han, Ye Liu +2 more

The paper introduces SymTEE, an LLM-assisted symbolic execution framework that detects missing input validation vulnerabilities in TEE applications without needing complex, real TEE setups.

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cs.CRcs.CVRecentMay 19, 2026

Exposing Functional Fusion: A New Class of Strategic Backdoor in Dynamic Prompt Architectures

Zeyao Liu, Zhendong Zhao, Xiaojun Chen, Xin Zhao +2 more

The paper introduces VIPER, a novel backdoor attack framework that exploits the functional fusion of malicious and benign logic within dynamic prompt architectures, demonstrating a new, high-risk thre…

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cs.CRRecentApr 11, 2026

PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification

Guangyu Gong, Zizhuang Deng

PlanGuard is a training-free defense framework that uses an isolated Planner and hierarchical verification to defend LLM agents against Indirect Prompt Injection by verifying the consistency of planne…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 27, 2026

Measuring Real-World Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-based Resume Screening

Mohan Zhang, Yuqi Jia, Zhen Tan, Steven Jiang +3 more

This study provides the first systematic measurement of prompt injection attacks in a real-world LLM-based resume screening application, finding that approximately 1% of resumes contain hidden injecti…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 27, 2026

Measuring Real-World Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-based Resume Screening

Mohan Zhang, Yuqi Jia, Zhen Tan, Steven Jiang +3 more

This study provides the first large-scale measurement of prompt injection attacks in real-world LLM-based resume screening, finding that approximately 1% of resumes contain hidden injections.

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cs.CRcs.PLcs.SERecentApr 28, 2026

Symbolic Execution Meets Multi-LLM Orchestration: Detecting Memory Vulnerabilities in Incomplete Rust CVE Snippets

Zeyad Abdelrazek, Young Lee

The paper introduces a novel multi-LLM orchestration system combined with symbolic execution to successfully detect memory vulnerabilities in uncompilable, incomplete Rust CVE code snippets, achieving…

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cs.CRRecentMay 5, 2026

The Infinite Mutation Engine? Measuring Polymorphism in LLM-Generated Offensive Code

Gabriel Hortea, Juan Tapiador

This paper quantifies the polymorphic capacity of a commercial LLM, demonstrating that it can cheaply generate large populations of structurally diverse, yet behaviorally equivalent, offensive code pa…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 22, 2026

An Empirical Evaluation of LLM-Generated Code Security Across Prompting Methods

Mohammed Kharma, Ahmed Sabbah, Mohammad Alkhanafseh, Mohammad Hammoudeh +1 more

The paper empirically evaluates the security quality of LLM-generated code across various prompting methods, finding that while prompting alters the structure of weaknesses, it is insufficient to reli…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

Willing but Unable: Separating Refusal from Capability in Code LLMs via Abliteration

Cristina Carleo, Pietro Liguori, Naghmeh Ivaki, Domenico Cotroneo

The paper introduces 'abliteration,' a weight editing technique that successfully bypasses the refusal mechanism of safety-aligned Code LLMs, enabling scalable synthesis of vulnerable code from safe i…

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cs.CRRecentMay 20, 2026

VIPER-MCP: Detecting and Exploiting Taint-Style Vulnerabilities in Model Context Protocol Servers

Pengyu Sun, Qishu Jin, Enhao Huang, Zifeng Kang +3 more

VIPER-MCP is a novel, end-to-end automated framework that detects and dynamically confirms the exploitability of taint-style vulnerabilities in Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers, achieving high-fid…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 26, 2026

The System Prompt Is the Attack Surface: How LLM Agent Configuration Shapes Security and Creates Exploitable Vulnerabilities

Ron Litvak

The security of LLM agents is critically dependent on their system prompt configuration, which creates a brittle attack surface that can be exploited by attackers inverting the prompt's core assumptio…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 8, 2026

Defense effectiveness across architectural layers: a mechanistic evaluation of persistent memory attacks on stateful LLM agents

Jun Wen Leong

The paper systematically evaluates various defense mechanisms against persistent memory attacks on LLM agents, finding that only tool-gating at the memory layer (Memory Sandbox) effectively mitigates…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 26, 2026

Evaluation of Prompt Injection Defenses in Large Language Models

Priyal Deep, Shane Emmons, Amy Fox, Kyle Bacon +3 more

The paper evaluates prompt injection defenses and finds that only external output filtering, implemented in application code, reliably prevents secret leaks from LLMs, demonstrating that model-based d…

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