Khaled Kirah

The paper analyzes the security of a partially masked hardware accelerator for Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) in PQC, demonstrating that the claimed security margins are significantly overestimated and proposing a practical, gap-creating masking strategy.

The paper introduces a four-stage structural dependency analysis hierarchy that enables scalable, sound first-order masking verification for large, production-level post-quantum cryptographic accelerators like ML-KEM and ML-DSA.

The paper provides the first machine-checked universal proof, using ring theory, that value-independence implies identical marginal distributions for arithmetic masking, thereby extending the verification scope from small finite fields to arbitrary prime moduli.

The paper provides machine-checked proofs demonstrating that fresh per-stage arithmetic masking ensures pipeline-level security for Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) accelerators used in Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC).

The paper establishes a universal, machine-checked 1-Bit Barrier for the internal wire map of masked Barrett reduction, providing a strong side-channel leakage bound for post-quantum cryptography.

The paper establishes the first machine-checked composition theorems for arithmetic masking over prime fields, demonstrating that fresh random masking between pipeline stages completely erases security parameter dependencies.

This paper proves that the per-observation leakage bound for deep, multi-stage masked Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) pipelines remains constant and low ($2/q$), regardless of the pipeline's depth ($k$), provided fresh inter-stage masking is used.