Thomas Eisenbarth

The paper introduces HPCCFA, a novel mechanism that leverages Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) to provide hardware-backed Control Flow Attestation (CFA) on commodity CPUs, thereby enhancing the security of Trusted Execution Environments against runtime attacks.

The paper introduces TrEEStealer, a novel side-channel attack that efficiently steals Decision Trees (DTs) protected within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), demonstrating that TEEs fail to provide adequate protection against control-flow leakage.

The paper evaluates code language model-based detection of vulnerability-fixing commits (VFCs) using a unified benchmark and concludes that code changes alone are insufficient for accurate detection, highlighting the critical role of commit messages.

The paper introduces uGen, the first LLM-driven framework that uses a retrieval-augmented, multi-agent design to automatically generate functionally correct microarchitectural attack Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) for vulnerability testing.