Stable Voting is PSPACE-Complete
This paper proves that winner determination under Stable Voting and Simple Stable Voting is PSPACE-complete.
Provides the first complexity analysis of Stable Voting and Simple Stable Voting.
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- →Voting systems
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Abstract
More Like ThisStable Voting and Simple Stable Voting, introduced by Holliday and Pacuit, are Condorcet-consistent voting rules defined recursively: a candidate wins if they would win after removing some opponent they beat, taking the pair with the largest margin first. The computational complexity of winner determination under these rules has been an open question. We resolve this problem: winner determination is PSPACE-complete under both Stable Voting and Simple Stable Voting.