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~ similar to 2603.22868v2· 20 results

cs.CRRecentMay 25, 2026

AgentSecBench: Measuring Prompt Injection, Privacy Leakage, and Tool-Use Integrity in LLM Agents

Faruk Alpay, Taylan Alpay

The paper introduces AgentSecBench, a security evaluation framework that measures prompt injection, privacy leakage, and tool-use integrity in LLM agents by defining formal security games and testing…

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cs.CRRecentApr 27, 2026

AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization

Zonghao Ying, Haozheng Wang, Jiangfan Liu, Quanchen Zou +4 more

AgentVisor is a novel defense framework that uses semantic virtualization, inspired by OS principles, to significantly reduce LLM agent vulnerability to prompt injection while maintaining high utility…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use

Chenglin Yang

AgentTrust is a novel runtime safety layer that intercepts and evaluates AI agent tool calls before execution, achieving high accuracy in detecting unsafe actions across complex and obfuscated scenari…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 11, 2026

The Granularity Mismatch in Agent Security: Argument-Level Provenance Solves Enforcement and Isolates the LLM Reasoning Bottleneck

Linfeng Fan, Ziwei Li, Yuan Tian, Yichen Wang +2 more

The paper introduces PACT, a provenance-aware runtime monitor that enhances agent security by tracking the origin and trust of individual tool arguments, solving the granularity mismatch in LLM agent…

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cs.CRcs.OSRecentApr 20, 2026

AgenTEE: Confidential LLM Agent Execution on Edge Devices

Sina Abdollahi, Mohammad M Maheri, Javad Forough, Amir Al Sadi +4 more

AgenTEE is a system that enables the secure, confidential execution of complex LLM agent pipelines directly on edge devices by using isolated confidential virtual machines.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.HCRecentMay 14, 2026

Known By Their Actions: Fingerprinting LLM Browser Agents via UI Traces

William Lugoloobi, Samuelle Marro, Jabez Magomere, Joss Wright +1 more

This paper demonstrates that an agent's behavioral patterns, captured through passive UI interaction traces, are sufficient to identify the underlying LLM model with high accuracy, posing a significan…

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cs.SEcs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 30, 2026

When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems

Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Junxian You +5 more

The paper introduces SkillReact, a framework that measures compositional risk in agent skill ecosystems, finding that even if individual skills are safe, their combination can create significant, unad…

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cs.SEcs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 30, 2026

When Safe Skills Collide: Measuring Compositional Risk in Agent Skill Ecosystems

Su Wang, Pin Qian, Yihang Chen, Junxian You +5 more

The paper introduces SkillReact, a framework that measures compositional risk in agent skill ecosystems, finding that even if individual skills are safe, their combination can create significant, expl…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentJun 3, 2026

From Agent Traces to Trust: Evidence Tracing and Execution Provenance in LLM Agents

Yiqi Wang, Jiaqi Zhang, Taotao Cai, Zirui Liu +5 more

This survey provides a systematic framework and taxonomy for evidence tracing and execution provenance in LLM agents, addressing the difficulty of verifying and auditing complex agent behaviors.

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 5, 2026

ARGUS: Defending LLM Agents Against Context-Aware Prompt Injection

Shihao Weng, Yang Feng, Jinrui Zhang, Xiaofei Xie +2 more

The paper introduces ARGUS, a defense mechanism that uses provenance-aware decision auditing to protect LLM agents from sophisticated, context-aware prompt injection attacks, significantly reducing th…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.MARecentMay 1, 2026

Skills as Verifiable Artifacts: A Trust Schema and a Biconditional Correctness Criterion for Human-in-the-Loop Agent Runtimes

Alfredo Metere

The paper proposes a trust schema and verification framework to ensure that agent skills, which augment LLMs, are rigorously verified before deployment, thereby making human-in-the-loop oversight scal…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 13, 2026

No Attack Required: Semantic Fuzzing for Specification Violations in Agent Skills

Ying Li, Hongbo Wen, Yanju Chen, Hanzhi Liu +2 more

The paper introduces Sefz, a semantic fuzzing framework that automatically discovers specification violations in LLM agent skills, finding a significant number of previously unknown exploitable guardr…

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cs.CRRecentMay 16, 2026

Securing LLM Agents Need Intent-to-Execution Integrity

Wenjie Qu, Ming Xu, Peiran Wang, Shengfang Zhai +2 more

The paper proposes defining 'intent-to-execution integrity' as the necessary end-to-end correctness property for securing LLM agents, arguing that current defenses are insufficient due to untrusted co…

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cs.CRRecentApr 25, 2026

When the Agent Is the Adversary: Architectural Requirements for Agentic AI Containment After the April 2026 Frontier Model Escape

Richard Joseph Mitchell

The paper analyzes the failure modes of current AI containment methods when the agent itself is the adversary, deriving five necessary architectural requirements for durable safety.

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cs.SEcs.AIcs.CRRecentJun 2, 2026

Proof-Carrying Agent Actions: Model-Agnostic Runtime Governance for Heterogeneous Agent Systems

Zexun Wang

The paper proposes Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA), a runtime-neutral governance model that uses action certificates to consistently track and authorize high-risk actions across diverse and hetero…

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cs.CRRecentMay 26, 2026

Aligning Provenance with Authorization: A Dual-Graph Defense for LLM Agents

Peiran Wang, Ying Li, Yuan Tian

The paper proposes AuthGraph, a dual-graph defense framework that structurally compares information provenance (what data was used) against a clean authorization baseline to detect fine-grained, param…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 7, 2026

LoopTrap: Termination Poisoning Attacks on LLM Agents

Huiyu Xu, Zhibo Wang, Wenhui Zhang, Ziqi Zhu +3 more

The paper introduces LoopTrap, an automated red-teaming framework that demonstrates how malicious prompts can poison the termination judgment of LLM agents, causing unbounded computation.

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

AgentWall: A Runtime Safety Layer for Local AI Agents

Ashwin Aravind

AgentWall is a runtime safety layer that intercepts and evaluates all proposed actions from local AI agents against a declarative policy, ensuring safety before execution.

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cs.CRRecentMar 24, 2026

SoK: The Attack Surface of Agentic AI -- Tools, and Autonomy

Ali Dehghantanha, Sajad Homayoun

This paper systematically maps the expanded attack surface of agentic AI systems, identifying new threat vectors like RAG poisoning and cross-agent manipulation, and proposes a comprehensive security…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 13, 2026

ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection

Wei Zhao, Zhe Li, Peixin Zhang, Jun Sun

ClawGuard is a novel runtime security framework that deterministically enforces user-confirmed rules at tool-call boundaries to protect LLM agents from indirect prompt injection.

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