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~ similar to 2604.03121v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.CVRecentMar 18, 2026

Toward Reliable, Safe, and Secure LLMs for Scientific Applications

Saket Sanjeev Chaturvedi, Joshua Bergerson, Tanwi Mallick

This paper addresses the critical need for trustworthy LLMs in science by proposing a comprehensive, multi-layered defense framework and methodology to evaluate unique scientific vulnerabilities.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 3, 2026

A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variants

Yuhang Wang, Haichang Gao, Zhenxing Niu, Zhaoxiang Liu +3 more

The paper systematically evaluates six OpenClaw-series AI agent frameworks, demonstrating that these agentized systems possess significant security vulnerabilities that are distinct from and more seve…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentApr 1, 2026

UK AISI Alignment Evaluation Case-Study

Alexandra Souly, Robert Kirk, Jacob Merizian, Abby D'Cruz +1 more

The study evaluated four frontier AI models to assess their reliability in following safety research goals, finding no confirmed instances of sabotage but noting that certain models frequently refuse…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 4, 2026

A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a validated, consensus-labeled prompt bank that separates requests for executable malicious code (weapons) from requests for general harmful security knowledge, providing a more g…

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cs.CRRecentMar 18, 2026

The Verifier Tax: Horizon Dependent Safety Success Tradeoffs in Tool Using LLM Agents

Tanmay Sah, Vishal Srivastava, Dolly Sah, Kayden Jordan

The paper analyzes how runtime safety enforcement impacts the performance of multi-step LLM agents, finding that while safety mechanisms can block unsafe actions, they impose a significant performance…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 12, 2026

SkillSafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety under Skill-Facing Attack Surfaces

Chang Jin, An Wang, Zeming Wei, Kai Wang +6 more

The paper introduces SkillSafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark demonstrating that agent safety failures often stem from adversarial influences within reusable skills and execution environments, rath…

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cs.ROcs.CRRecentMay 15, 2026

Propagating Unsafe Actions in LLM Controlled Multi-Robot Collaboration via Single Robot Compromise

Zhen Huang, Zhihuang Liu, Mengxuan Luo, Weishang Wu +1 more

The paper proposes a novel attack paradigm demonstrating how compromising a single robot in an LLM-controlled multi-robot system can rapidly propagate malicious intent to cause coordinated unsafe acti…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentApr 5, 2026

LLM-Enabled Open-Source Systems in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Vulnerabilities in GitHub Security Advisories

Fariha Tanjim Shifat, Hariswar Baburaj, Ce Zhou, Jaydeb Sarker +1 more

The paper analyzes GitHub security advisories for LLM-integrated open-source systems, finding that while most vulnerabilities map to existing code-level weaknesses, the architectural risks like Supply…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 11, 2026

Benchmarking Safety Risks of Knowledge-Intensive Reasoning under Malicious Knowledge Editing

Qinghua Mao, Xi Lin, Jinze Gu, Jun Wu +2 more

The paper introduces EditRisk-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the safety risks and downstream reasoning corruption caused by malicious knowledge editing in large language…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 17, 2026

Security Assessment and Mitigation Strategies for Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Defensive Framework

Taiwo Onitiju, Iman Vakilinia

The paper establishes a standardized security assessment framework and develops a multi-layered defensive system, demonstrating that systematic testing and external defenses are crucial for safe LLM d…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.ETRecentMar 27, 2026

Clawed and Dangerous: Can We Trust Open Agentic Systems?

Shiping Chen, Qin Wang, Guangsheng Yu, Xu Wang +1 more

This paper systematizes the security challenges of open agentic systems, concluding that while attack characterization is mature, the field lacks robust guidelines for operational governance, memory i…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and success rate of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation capabilit…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

How Reliable Are AI Attackers Against a Fixed Vulnerable Target? A 400-Run Empirical Study of LLM Penetration Testing Consistency

Galip Tolga Erdem

This study empirically measures the consistency and effectiveness of autonomous LLM penetration testing across multiple services, finding statistically significant differences in exploitation rates am…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 12, 2026

The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents

Xuwei Ding, Skylar Zhai, Linxin Song, Jiate Li +5 more

The paper introduces OS-BLIND, a benchmark demonstrating that current safety evaluations fail to detect critical vulnerabilities in computer-use agents when user instructions are benign, showing high…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 6, 2026

Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw

Zijun Wang, Haoqin Tu, Letian Zhang, Hardy Chen +10 more

This paper conducts the first real-world safety evaluation of the personal AI agent OpenClaw, demonstrating that its broad system access creates inherent vulnerabilities that significantly increase th…

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cs.CRRecentMar 28, 2026

SafeClaw-R: Towards Safe and Secure Multi-Agent Personal Assistants

Haoyu Wang, Zibo Xiao, Yedi Zhang, Christopher M. Poskitt +1 more

The paper proposes SafeClaw-R, a novel framework that enforces safety as a system-level invariant over the execution graph to mitigate the high safety and security risks inherent in autonomous multi-a…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 11, 2026

Like a Hammer, It Can Build, It Can Break: Large Language Model Uses, Perceptions, and Adoption in Cybersecurity Operations on Reddit

Souradip Nath, Chih-Yi Huang, Aditi Ganapathi, Kashyap Thimmaraju +2 more

Analyzing Reddit discussions, the paper finds that while security practitioners see LLMs as useful for boosting productivity, their adoption is constrained by concerns over reliability, verification,…

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cs.CRcs.CLRecentMay 31, 2026

BraveGuard: From Open-World Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents

Yunhao Feng, Xiaohu Du, Xinhao Deng, Yifan Ding +12 more

BraveGuard is a self-evolving defense framework that significantly improves the safety monitoring of computer-use agents by generating guard model supervision from open-world threat discovery and real…

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cs.CRcs.CLRecentMay 31, 2026

BraveGuard: From Open-World Threats to Safer Computer-Use Agents

Yunhao Feng, Yifan Ding, Xiaohu Du, Ming Wen +12 more

BraveGuard is a self-evolving defense framework that improves the safety of computer-use agents by training guard models on open-world, multi-step threat trajectories rather than static benchmarks.

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