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~ similar to 2604.04193v1· 20 results

cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 8, 2026

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Transaction Selection in DAG-Based Distributed Ledgers

Sebastian Müller, Alexandre Reiffers-Masson

The paper analyzes transaction selection strategies in DAG-based distributed ledgers using game theory, finding that Collaborative Fee Sharing (CFS) achieves superior performance compared to Random Fe…

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q-fin.TRcs.CRRecentMay 31, 2026

Strategic Users in a Priority Queue with Bulk Service on Blockchains

Donghwa Seo, Kyoung-Kuk Kim

This paper models transaction fee dynamics on blockchains by treating the transaction queue as a priority queue, providing analytical insights into how user delay costs influence fees.

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cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in state synchronization and signature design that allow attackers to exploit payment systems for resource leakage in…

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cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing critical synchronization and security flaws that allow attackers to exploit payment systems and force merchants to subsidize compute costs.

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cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

Adversarial procurement in blockchains

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg

The paper designs an optimal mechanism for soliciting expensive computational tasks in adversarial blockchain environments, showing that the loss of optimality scales logarithmically with the cost of…

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cs.CRcs.DCcs.GTRecentJun 3, 2026

Bitcoin After Block Rewards

Junhyuk Lee

This paper analyzes the conditions under which Bitcoin's security might fail due to miners deviating from honest mining when block rewards decline to zero, concluding that protocol mechanisms can miti…

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cs.CRRecentMay 28, 2026

Scarcity Is Not Enough: An Impossibility Result for Linear Sybil Cost Under Parallelizable Resources

Homayoun Maleki, Nekane Sainz, Jon Legarda, Igor Santos-Grueiro

The paper proves that for resources with structural parallelizability (like divisibility and transferability), it is impossible to enforce a linear cost for concentrating influence, demonstrating that…

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cs.GTcs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 12, 2026

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool

Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami

This paper models Ethereum's mempool as a dynamic scheduling problem using an MDP, showing that dynamic pricing stabilizes the system and maximizes long-run rewards, and that the optimal policy conver…

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cs.CRRecentJun 1, 2026

Unicity: Predicates and Atomic Swaps

Ahto Buldas, Dirk Draheim, Mike Gault, Risto Laanoja +2 more

The paper generalizes Unicity token ownership using programmable spending conditions called predicates, enabling trustless atomic swaps and smart-contract-like functionality executed off-chain.

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cs.CRRecentApr 5, 2026

Streaming Chain

Yi Lyu

This paper proposes a self-adaptive block creation process for blockchain systems that automatically optimizes configurations to reduce transaction latency by predicting performance based on workload…

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cs.CRRecentMar 29, 2026

Ordering Power is Sanctioning Power: Sanction Evasion-MEV and the Limits of On-Chain Enforcement

Di Wu, Yuman Bai, Shoupeng Ren, Xinyu Zhang +4 more

The paper demonstrates that on public blockchains, the ability to dictate transaction order (ordering power) is the true source of sanctioning power, as block producers can extract value (SE-MEV) by p…

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cs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

The Cost of Quantum Resistance: A Hash-Based Commit-Reveal Alternative for Minimizing Blockchain Infrastructure Overhead

Keir Finlow-Bates, Markus Jakobsson, Hossein Siadati

The paper proposes a hash-based commit-reveal alternative to minimize the infrastructural overhead associated with adopting large post-quantum signature schemes in blockchain transactions.

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cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 26, 2026

A Trilemma in AMM Mechanism Design

Yuhao Li, Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang

The paper analyzes the trade-offs in designing Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and proves a 'trilemma' theorem showing that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve incentive compatibility (IC), weak…

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cs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization

Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

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cs.CERecentMay 30, 2026

To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Fei Wu, Burak Öz

The paper analyzes arbitrage competition on high-throughput blockchains, finding that while probabilistic search accounts for a small fraction of activity, it is disproportionately responsible for spa…

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cs.MAcs.CRRecentApr 21, 2026

ClawCoin: An Agentic AI-Native Cryptocurrency for Decentralized Agent Economies

Shaoyu Li, Chaoyu Zhang, Hexuan Yu, Y. Thomas Hou +1 more

The paper introduces ClawCoin, a novel tokenized, compute-cost-indexed unit of account designed to solve the problem of non-transferable compute costs in decentralized AI agent economies.

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cs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 6, 2026

Economic Security of VDF-Based Randomness Beacons: Models, Thresholds, and Design Guidelines

Zhenhang Shang, Kani Chen

This paper develops a formal economic framework to assess the security of VDF-based randomness beacons, demonstrating that many proposed delays are economically insecure due to rational, profit-motiva…

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cs.CRcs.CYcs.DCRecentJun 3, 2026

The Usefulness Gap in Proof-of-Useful-Work: An Empirical Study of Pearl's cuPOW Protocol

Abhinaba Basu

This empirical study of Pearl's cuPOW protocol demonstrates that the network's Proof-of-Useful-Work mechanism generates zero useful AI computation, instead causing economic harm and displacing legitim…

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cs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 7, 2026

SuperPaymaster: Eliminating Centralized Signer Authority via Asset-Oriented Abstraction to Reconcile Usability and Decentralization in Account Abstraction

Huifeng Jiao, Nathapon Udomlertsakul

The paper introduces SuperPaymaster, an Asset-Oriented Abstraction (AOA) paymaster that eliminates the need for a centralized off-chain signer, thereby improving the decentralization and efficiency of…

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cs.CRRecentMar 25, 2026

Trusted-Execution Environment (TEE) for Solving the Replication Crisis in Academia

Jiasun Li, Project Team

The paper proposes using Trusted-Execution Environments (TEEs) to create a scalable, privacy-preserving system where authors can submit cryptographic proofs of correct research replication, thereby ad…

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