~ similar to 2604.06092v1· 20 results
This paper analyzes the conditions under which Bitcoin's security might fail due to miners deviating from honest mining when block rewards decline to zero, concluding that protocol mechanisms can miti…
This paper models transaction fee dynamics on blockchains by treating the transaction queue as a priority queue, providing analytical insights into how user delay costs influence fees.
The paper analyzes the potential market impact of a large, unknown Bitcoin holder (the Satoshi overhang) and concludes that the mechanical downside risk is bounded, suggesting the terminal states are…
Shaoyu Li, Chaoyu Zhang, Hexuan Yu, Y. Thomas Hou +1 more
The paper introduces ClawCoin, a novel tokenized, compute-cost-indexed unit of account designed to solve the problem of non-transferable compute costs in decentralized AI agent economies.
This empirical study of Pearl's cuPOW protocol demonstrates that the network's Proof-of-Useful-Work mechanism generates zero useful AI computation, instead causing economic harm and displacing legitim…
Intercloud proposes a decentralized economic network that achieves eventual consistency and security using a novel 'chilling-effect consensus' mechanism, eliminating the need for global coordination.
This study demonstrates that the publicly distributed firmware of ASIC cryptocurrency miners constitutes a primary and sufficient attack surface, allowing attackers to reconstruct internal architectur…
Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more
The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…
The paper analyzes transaction fee mechanisms in modern blockchains that use parallel execution and contingency, proving an inherent trade-off between minimizing risks for users and maximizing revenue…
This paper models Ethereum's mempool as a dynamic scheduling problem using an MDP, showing that dynamic pricing stabilizes the system and maximizes long-run rewards, and that the optimal policy conver…
The paper designs an optimal mechanism for soliciting expensive computational tasks in adversarial blockchain environments, showing that the loss of optimality scales logarithmically with the cost of…
The paper proposes a hash-based commit-reveal alternative to minimize the infrastructural overhead associated with adopting large post-quantum signature schemes in blockchain transactions.
The paper analyzes transaction selection strategies in DAG-based distributed ledgers using game theory, finding that Collaborative Fee Sharing (CFS) achieves superior performance compared to Random Fe…
The paper introduces Temporary Power Adjusting Withholding (T-PAW), a generalized and more potent block withholding attack than the existing PAW attack, demonstrating that this attack can yield signif…
The paper proposes Proof of Useful Attestation (PoUA), a consensus mechanism that weights validator vote power not just by staked capital, but also by a reputation score earned through performing vali…
This paper advances the lightweight blockchain verification protocol, FlyClient, by addressing technical challenges, introducing a new adversary model, and providing practical implementations and opti…
Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more
This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in state synchronization and signature design that allow attackers to exploit payment systems for resource leakage in…
Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more
This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing critical synchronization and security flaws that allow attackers to exploit payment systems and force merchants to subsidize compute costs.
This paper proposes a self-adaptive block creation process for blockchain systems that automatically optimizes configurations to reduce transaction latency by predicting performance based on workload…
The paper analyzes the trade-offs in designing Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and proves a 'trilemma' theorem showing that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve incentive compatibility (IC), weak…