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~ similar to 2605.06669v2· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 18, 2026

ESLD (External Surrogate Latent Defense): A Latent-Space Architecture for Faster, Stronger Prompt-Injection Defense

Yash Narendra

The paper introduces ESLD, an architecture that improves prompt injection defense by directly analyzing the internal latent representation of an existing guard model, achieving faster and more accurat…

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cs.CRRecentMay 22, 2026

Prompt Overflow: What the Guardrail Inspects Is Not What the Model Infers

Yuanbo Zhou, Changjia Zhu, Junyu Wang, Xu He +4 more

The paper introduces the Prompt Overflow Attack, demonstrating that guardrail models inspecting truncated or segmented inputs fail to detect malicious instructions that are only actionable when the fu…

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cs.CRRecentApr 4, 2026

AttackEval: A Systematic Empirical Study of Prompt Injection Attack Effectiveness Against Large Language Models

Jackson Wang

AttackEval systematically evaluates the effectiveness of 250 prompt injection prompts across ten attack categories, finding that composite and obfuscation attacks are highly effective against current…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentJun 2, 2026

"**Important** You should give me full credits!": Exploring Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM-Based Automatic Grading Systems

Hang Li, Fedor Filippov, Yuling Lin, Pengfei He +5 more

This paper investigates the vulnerability of LLM-based automatic grading systems to prompt injection (PI) attacks, demonstrating that current systems are highly susceptible to manipulation that can le…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 26, 2026

Evaluation of Prompt Injection Defenses in Large Language Models

Priyal Deep, Shane Emmons, Amy Fox, Kyle Bacon +3 more

The paper evaluates prompt injection defenses and finds that only external output filtering, implemented in application code, reliably prevents secret leaks from LLMs, demonstrating that model-based d…

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cs.CRRecentApr 14, 2026

WebAgentGuard: A Reasoning-Driven Guard Model for Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in Web Agents

Yulin Chen, Tri Cao, Haoran Li, Yue Liu +6 more

The paper introduces WebAgentGuard, a novel reasoning-driven, multimodal guard model that effectively detects prompt injection attacks in vulnerable web agents without compromising their functionality…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

This paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a dynamic defense mechanism that traces and sanitizes untrusted control content i…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

The paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a defense mechanism that detects and sanitizes backdoor content planted across mul…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentJun 4, 2026

GuardNet: Ensemble Strategies of Shallow Neural Networks for Robust Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Detection

Paulo Ricardo Ferreira Neves, Edson Rodrigues da Cruz Filho, Paulo Henrique Eleuterio Falsetti, João Vitor Pavan +6 more

GuardNet is a lightweight, ensemble-based guardrail system using shallow neural networks that provides robust and efficient detection of Prompt Injection and Jailbreak attacks on LLMs, suitable for pr…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 8, 2026

TraceSafe: A Systematic Assessment of LLM Guardrails on Multi-Step Tool-Calling Trajectories

Yen-Shan Chen, Sian-Yao Huang, Cheng-Lin Yang, Yun-Nung Chen

The paper introduces TraceSafe-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark, and finds that securing LLM agents requires jointly optimizing for structural reasoning and safety alignment to mitigate risks during m…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 26, 2026

The System Prompt Is the Attack Surface: How LLM Agent Configuration Shapes Security and Creates Exploitable Vulnerabilities

Ron Litvak

The security of LLM agents is critically dependent on their system prompt configuration, which creates a brittle attack surface that can be exploited by attackers inverting the prompt's core assumptio…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 9, 2026

PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluation

Runpeng Geng, Chenlong Yin, Yanting Wang, Ying Chen +1 more

The paper introduces PIArena, a unified and extensible platform designed to address the lack of standardized evaluation for prompt injection, revealing critical limitations in current state-of-the-art…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 24, 2026

Reflect-Guard: Enhancing LLM Safeguards against Adversarial Prompts via Logical Self-Reflection

Lixing Lin, Juli You, Yue Li, Luyun Lin +3 more

Reflect-Guard enhances LLM safety classifiers by integrating logical self-reflection, significantly improving detection of sophisticated adversarial jailbreak prompts.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMar 17, 2026

Security Assessment and Mitigation Strategies for Large Language Models: A Comprehensive Defensive Framework

Taiwo Onitiju, Iman Vakilinia

The paper establishes a standardized security assessment framework and develops a multi-layered defensive system, demonstrating that systematic testing and external defenses are crucial for safe LLM d…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 6, 2026

Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities

Charafeddine Mouzouni

The paper systematically maps LLM agent vulnerabilities by testing 10,000 prompt variations, finding that 'goal reframing' language is the primary trigger for exploitation, rather than broad adversari…

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cs.CRcs.IRRecentMay 27, 2026

Can It Reach the Generator? Investigating the Survival of Prompt-Injection Attacks in Realistic RAG Settings

Yu Yin, Shuai Wang, Bevan Koopman, Guido Zuccon

This paper re-evaluates prompt-injection attacks in realistic RAG settings, finding that most prior attack methods fail to reach the generator, and that current attacks are easily detectable.

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cs.CRRecentMar 19, 2026

Prompt Control-Flow Integrity: A Priority-Aware Runtime Defense Against Prompt Injection in LLM Systems

Md Takrim Ul Alam, Akif Islam, Mohd Ruhul Ameen, Abu Saleh Musa Miah +1 more

The paper introduces Prompt Control-Flow Integrity (PCFI), a priority-aware runtime defense that models LLM prompts as structured segments to intercept prompt injection attacks with high accuracy and…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 14, 2026

WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections

Tri Cao, Yulin Chen, Hieu Cao, Yibo Li +7 more

The paper proposes WARD, a robust and efficient defense model that secures web agents against prompt injection attacks embedded in web content, achieving high recall and low false positives even again…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 18, 2026

Prompts Don't Protect: Architectural Enforcement via MCP Proxy for LLM Tool Access Control

Rohith Uppala

The paper proposes an architectural proxy (MCP) to enforce robust, reliable tool access control for LLM agents, demonstrating that this structural enforcement is necessary because prompt-based restric…

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