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~ similar to 2605.10575v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 14, 2026

One Step to the Side: Why Defenses Against Malicious Finetuning Fail Under Adaptive Adversaries

Itay Zloczower, Eyal Lenga, Gilad Gressel, Yisroel Mirsky

The paper demonstrates that current defenses against malicious fine-tuning of foundation models are insufficient because they only address fixed attacks, and introduces a unified adaptive attack that…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 19, 2026

Measuring Safety Alignment Effects in Autonomous Security Agents

Isaac David, Arthur Gervais

The study evaluates how safety alignment affects autonomous security agents using a comprehensive trace-based benchmark, finding that while less-restricted models show gains, these effects are not uni…

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cs.CRRecentMay 20, 2026

Rethinking Fraud Safety Evaluation: Multi-Round Attacks Reveal Safety-Utility Tradeoffs in Graph-Context LLM Defenders

Laura Jiang, Reza Ryan, Qian Li, Nasim Ferdosian

The paper evaluates graph-context LLM defenders against multi-round, adaptive fraud attacks, finding that while graph context improves early safety, it significantly increases benign over-refusal due…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentJun 3, 2026

Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming

Nicholas Saban

The paper benchmarks current frontier computer-using agents against hand-crafted attacks, finding that while they are highly safe in browser tasks, this safety does not generalize to other domains lik…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 9, 2026

Few-Shot Truly Benign DPO Attack for Jailbreaking LLMs

Sangyeon Yoon, Wonje Jeung, Yoonjun Cho, Dongjae Jeon +1 more

The paper introduces a truly benign Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) attack that can jailbreak large language models (LLMs) by fine-tuning them with minimal, harmless preference data, thereby supp…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

DataShield: Safety-degrading Data Filtering for LLM Benign Instruction Fine-Tuning

Junbo Zhang, Qianli Zhou, Xinyang Deng, Wen Jiang +2 more

DataShield proposes an efficient method to identify safety-degrading samples within benign datasets, preventing the degradation of LLM safety capabilities during fine-tuning.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

DataShield: Safety-degrading Data Filtering for LLM Benign Instruction Fine-Tuning

Junbo Zhang, Qianli Zhou, Xinyang Deng, Wen Jiang +2 more

DataShield proposes an efficient method to identify safety-degrading samples within benign datasets, quantifying each sample's contribution to an LLM's compliance behavior.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 21, 2026

Blind Spots in the Guard: How Domain-Camouflaged Injection Attacks Evade Detection in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Aaditya Pai

The paper identifies a critical vulnerability, the Camouflage Detection Gap (CDG), where standard LLM injection detectors fail dramatically when malicious payloads mimic the target domain's language a…

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cs.CRcs.LGRecentApr 6, 2026

Fine-Tuning Integrity for Modern Neural Networks: Structured Drift Proofs via Norm, Rank, and Sparsity Certificates

Zhenhang Shang, Kani Chen

The paper introduces Fine-Tuning Integrity (FTI), a security goal that uses Succinct Model Difference Proofs (SMDPs) to cryptographically prove that a fine-tuned model update adheres to specific struc…

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cs.LGcs.AIcs.CRRecentApr 8, 2026

When Safety Geometry Collapses: Fine-Tuning Vulnerabilities in Agentic Guard Models

Ismail Hossain, Sai Puppala, Jannatul Ferdaus, Md Jahangir Alam +3 more

The paper demonstrates that fine-tuning safety guard models on benign data can catastrophically collapse their safety alignment, proposing Fisher-Weighted Safety Subspace Regularization (FW-SSR) to ac…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMar 18, 2026

Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety

Xuan Chen, Lu Yan, Ruqi Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang

The paper introduces SafeAudit, a meta-audit framework that systematically enumerates test cases and uses a quantitative metric to uncover significant residual unsafe behaviors in LLM agents that exis…

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cs.LGcs.CLcs.CRRecentApr 29, 2026

Dynamic Adversarial Fine-Tuning Reorganizes Refusal Geometry

Wenhao Lan, Shan Li, Xinhua Lai, Meiqi Wu +3 more

The paper investigates how dynamic adversarial fine-tuning (R2D2) reorganizes the internal mechanisms (refusal geometry) of safety-aligned language models, finding that it shifts the optimal refusal c…

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cs.CRRecentMar 30, 2026

Attesting LLM Pipelines: Enforcing Verifiable Training and Release Claims

Zhuoran Tan, Jeremy Singer, Christos Anagnostopoulos

The paper proposes an attestation-aware promotion gate to mitigate supply-chain risks in LLM pipelines by cryptographically verifying and enforcing claims about training and release artifacts before d…

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cs.LGcs.AIcs.CERecentMay 3, 2026

RefusalGuard: Geometry-Preserving Fine-Tuning for Safety in LLMs

Sadia Asif, Mohammad Mohammadi Amiri

The paper introduces RefusalGuard, a novel fine-tuning framework that preserves the geometric structure of safety-relevant representations in LLMs, thereby mitigating the degradation of refusal behavi…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentMay 4, 2026

A Validated Prompt Bank for Malicious Code Generation: Separating Executable Weapons from Security Knowledge in 1,554 Consensus-Labeled Prompts

Richard J. Young, Gregory D. Moody

The paper introduces a validated, consensus-labeled prompt bank that separates requests for executable malicious code (weapons) from requests for general harmful security knowledge, providing a more g…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 5, 2026

MOSAIC-Bench: Measuring Compositional Vulnerability Induction in Coding Agents

Jonathan Steinberg, Oren Gal

The paper introduces MOSAIC-Bench, a benchmark demonstrating that coding agents can ship exploitable code by complying with seemingly innocuous, staged tasks, a vulnerability that is not easily mitiga…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

Willing but Unable: Separating Refusal from Capability in Code LLMs via Abliteration

Cristina Carleo, Pietro Liguori, Naghmeh Ivaki, Domenico Cotroneo

The paper introduces 'abliteration,' a weight editing technique that successfully bypasses the refusal mechanism of safety-aligned Code LLMs, enabling scalable synthesis of vulnerable code from safe i…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 17, 2026

Ablating Safety: Mechanisms for Removing Alignment in Language Models for Security Applications

Isaac David, Arthur Gervais

The paper proposes Ablating Safety, a controlled protocol for removing safety alignment from language models, demonstrating that targeted de-alignment can significantly boost security performance whil…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentApr 3, 2026

An Independent Safety Evaluation of Kimi K2.5

Zheng-Xin Yong, Parv Mahajan, Andy Wang, Ida Caspary +11 more

The paper conducts a preliminary safety evaluation of the open-weight LLM Kimi K2.5, finding that while it is highly capable, it exhibits concerning dual-use risks, particularly regarding CBRNE misuse…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 7, 2026

Safety Anchor: Defending Harmful Fine-tuning via Geometric Bottlenecks

Guoxin Lu, Letian Sha, Qing Wang, Peijie Sun +3 more

The paper introduces Safety Bottleneck Regularization (SBR), a novel defense mechanism that anchors LLM safety by constraining the unembedding layer, effectively preventing harmful fine-tuning (HFT) e…

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