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~ similar to 2605.10779v1· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 21, 2026

Benchmarking Autonomous Agents against Temporal, Spatial, and Semantic Evasions

Jianan Ma, Xiaohu Du, Ruixiao Lin, Yaoxiang Bian +7 more

The paper introduces a multi-dimensional evasion framework and a new benchmark (A3S-Bench) to test autonomous agents, demonstrating that stateful, multi-turn attacks significantly increase system risk…

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cs.CRcs.LGRecentApr 22, 2026

Breaking Bad: Interpretability-Based Safety Audits of State-of-the-Art LLMs

Krishiv Agarwal, Ramneet Kaur, Colin Samplawski, Manoj Acharya +5 more

The paper conducts an interpretability-driven safety audit of eight state-of-the-art LLMs, demonstrating that while interpretability-based steering is a powerful auditing tool, model robustness varies…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

This paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a dynamic defense mechanism that traces and sanitizes untrusted control content i…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLRecentMay 29, 2026

From Prompt Injection to Persistent Control: Defending Agentic Harness Against Trojan Backdoors

Jiejun Tan, Zhicheng Dou, Xinyu Yang, Yuyang Hu +3 more

The paper introduces ClawTrojan, a benchmark for multi-step trojan attacks against LLM agents, and proposes DASGuard, a defense mechanism that detects and sanitizes backdoor content planted across mul…

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cs.CRcs.LGRecentApr 25, 2026

A Systematic Survey of Security Threats and Defenses in LLM-Based AI Agents: A Layered Attack Surface Framework

Kexin Chu

The paper proposes the Layered Attack Surface Model (LASM), a structural taxonomy that maps security threats and defenses across the complex, multi-layered architecture of AI agents, revealing signifi…

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cs.CRRecentMay 2, 2026

Toward a Principled Framework for Agent Safety Measurement

Shuyi Lin, Anshuman Suri, Alina Oprea, Cheng Tan

The paper introduces BOA, a novel framework that measures agent safety by exhaustively searching the entire in-budget trajectory space, thereby identifying unsafe behaviors missed by traditional sampl…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 7, 2026

LoopTrap: Termination Poisoning Attacks on LLM Agents

Huiyu Xu, Zhibo Wang, Wenhui Zhang, Ziqi Zhu +3 more

The paper introduces LoopTrap, an automated red-teaming framework that demonstrates how malicious prompts can poison the termination judgment of LLM agents, causing unbounded computation.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 15, 2026

SafeHarness: Lifecycle-Integrated Security Architecture for LLM-based Agent Deployment

Xixun Lin, Yang Liu, Yancheng Chen, Yongxuan Wu +7 more

The paper introduces SafeHarness, a novel, lifecycle-integrated security architecture that significantly reduces unsafe behavior and attack success rates in LLM agents by weaving multiple defense laye…

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cs.CRRecentMay 29, 2026

TRACE: Task-Aware Adaptive Self-Evolving Agentic Jailbreaking

Churui Zeng, Weiwei Qi, Kedong Xiu, Tianhang Zheng +4 more

The paper proposes TRACE, a novel agentic jailbreaking framework that successfully bypasses safety mechanisms of advanced LLM agents by decomposing malicious tasks and disguising harmful subtasks with…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 6, 2026

SoK: Robustness in Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks

Feiyue Xu, Hongsheng Hu, Chaoxiang He, Sheng Hang +8 more

This paper introduces Security Cube, a comprehensive, multi-dimensional framework for evaluating LLM robustness against jailbreak attacks, providing a systematic taxonomy and benchmark analysis of exi…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 22, 2026

When the Manual Lies: A Realistic Benchmark to Evaluate MCP Poisoning Attacks for LLM Agents

Shi Liu, Xuehai Tang, Xikang Yang, Liang Lin +3 more

This paper introduces a new benchmark to test Tool Description Poisoning (TDP) attacks on LLM agents, demonstrating that even advanced models like GPT-4o are highly vulnerable and that current defense…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMar 22, 2026

Session Risk Memory (SRM): Temporal Authorization for Deterministic Pre-Execution Safety Gates

Florin Adrian Chitan

The paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight module that enhances per-action authorization gates with trajectory-level risk assessment, significantly improving detection of distribute…

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cs.CRRecentApr 24, 2026

Automation-Exploit: A Multi-Agent LLM Framework for Adaptive Offensive Security with Digital Twin-Based Risk-Mitigated Exploitation

Biagio Andreucci, Arcangelo Castiglione

Automation-Exploit is a multi-agent LLM framework that enables adaptive offensive security by using a digital twin to safely test and execute high-risk memory-corruption exploits on live targets.

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cs.CLcs.CRRecentMay 18, 2026

Agent Meltdowns: The Road to Hell Is Paved with Helpful Agents

Rishi Jha, Harold Triedman, Arkaprabha Bhattacharya, Vitaly Shmatikov

The paper introduces and measures 'accidental meltdown,' a new type of unsafe agent behavior triggered by benign environmental errors, finding that such meltdowns occur frequently and often involve hi…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 12, 2026

The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents

Xuwei Ding, Skylar Zhai, Linxin Song, Jiate Li +5 more

The paper introduces OS-BLIND, a benchmark demonstrating that current safety evaluations fail to detect critical vulnerabilities in computer-use agents when user instructions are benign, showing high…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 13, 2026

ExploitBench: A Capability Ladder Benchmark for LLM Cybersecurity Agents

Seunghyun Lee, David Brumley

The paper introduces ExploitBench, a capability-graded benchmark that measures the progressive stages of exploitation, demonstrating that while current frontier models can easily trigger bugs, achievi…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMar 18, 2026

Who Tests the Testers? Systematic Enumeration and Coverage Audit of LLM Agent Tool Call Safety

Xuan Chen, Lu Yan, Ruqi Zhang, Xiangyu Zhang

The paper introduces SafeAudit, a meta-audit framework that systematically enumerates test cases and uses a quantitative metric to uncover significant residual unsafe behaviors in LLM agents that exis…

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cs.ROcs.CRRecentMay 15, 2026

Propagating Unsafe Actions in LLM Controlled Multi-Robot Collaboration via Single Robot Compromise

Zhen Huang, Zhihuang Liu, Mengxuan Luo, Weishang Wu +1 more

The paper proposes a novel attack paradigm demonstrating how compromising a single robot in an LLM-controlled multi-robot system can rapidly propagate malicious intent to cause coordinated unsafe acti…

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cs.SEcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Towards Demystifying and Repairing LLM-in-the-Loop Vulnerabilities

Yujie Ma, Jialin Rong, Chenxi Yang, Lili Quan +3 more

The paper addresses the gap in understanding real-world LLM-in-the-loop vulnerabilities by creating the LLMCVE dataset and demonstrating that these vulnerabilities are significantly harder to repair t…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

AgentTrust: Runtime Safety Evaluation and Interception for AI Agent Tool Use

Chenglin Yang

AgentTrust is a novel runtime safety layer that intercepts and evaluates AI agent tool calls before execution, achieving high accuracy in detecting unsafe actions across complex and obfuscated scenari…

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