ArXivCSExplorer
☆☆Bookmarks🏆RSSHow to UseFAQ
Built with and by Teycir Ben Soltane•
How to Use•FAQ•GitHub•arXiv.org•
Share:

~ similar to 2605.15746v5· 20 results

cs.GTcs.CRmath.PRRecentMay 25, 2026

The Privacy Subsidy in Continuous-Time Kyle: Cumulative Welfare under Noise-Perturbed Order-Flow Observation

Yuki Nakamura

This paper extends the privacy subsidy concept from the single-period Kyle model to continuous time, deriving a closed-form expression for the cumulative expected transfer (privacy subsidy) in a conti…

View →
cs.GTcs.CRmath.PRRecentMay 19, 2026

The Privacy Subsidy in Glosten-Milgrom: Bid-Ask Spread and Welfare under Flip-Noise Direction Observation

Yuki Nakamura

This paper analyzes the bid-ask spread and welfare in the Glosten-Milgrom model when the market maker observes a noisy, privacy-protected trade direction signal, deriving a specific 'privacy subsidy'…

View →
cs.ITcs.CRcs.LGRecentMay 28, 2026

Local Differential Privacy with Correlated Noise Achieves Central-DP Optimal Cost

Madhura Pathegama, Srikanth Avasarala, Viveck R. Cadambe, Juba Ziani

The paper demonstrates that by introducing carefully designed correlations among locally added noise variables, local differential privacy mechanisms can achieve an estimation cost matching the optima…

View →
cs.CRcs.ITRecentMay 4, 2026

Optimal Privacy-Utility Trade-Offs in LDP: Functional and Geometric Perspectives

Seung-Hyun Nam, Hyun-Young Park, Si-Hyeon Lee

The paper develops a unified theoretical framework to systematically characterize the optimal privacy-utility trade-off (PUT) and optimal Local Differential Privacy (LDP) channels for general statisti…

View →
cs.CRRecentApr 17, 2026

Privacy, Prediction, and Allocation

Ben Jacobsen, Nitin Kohli

This paper analyzes the trade-offs between privacy, efficiency, and targeting precision in aid allocation systems by studying private variants of both individual and unit-level allocation strategies.

View →
cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

Adversarial procurement in blockchains

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg

The paper designs an optimal mechanism for soliciting expensive computational tasks in adversarial blockchain environments, showing that the loss of optimality scales logarithmically with the cost of…

View →
q-fin.GNcs.CRRecentApr 30, 2026

The Satoshi Overhang: Why the Bear Case is Bounded

Karl T. Ulrich

The paper analyzes the potential market impact of a large, unknown Bitcoin holder (the Satoshi overhang) and concludes that the mechanical downside risk is bounded, suggesting the terminal states are…

View →
cs.CERecentMay 30, 2026

To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Fei Wu, Burak Öz

The paper analyzes arbitrage competition on high-throughput blockchains, finding that while probabilistic search accounts for a small fraction of activity, it is disproportionately responsible for spa…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 27, 2026

Mind the Gap: Mixtures of Gaussians in Approximate Differential Privacy

Huikang Liu, Aras Selvi, Wolfram Wiesemann

The paper introduces 'mixture mechanisms,' a novel class of additive noise mechanisms that achieve approximate differential privacy by mixing multiple Gaussian distributions, resulting in lower noise…

View →
cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 27, 2026

Mind the Gap: Mixtures of Gaussians in Approximate Differential Privacy

Huikang Liu, Aras Selvi, Wolfram Wiesemann

The paper introduces 'mixture mechanisms,' a novel class of additive noise mechanisms that achieve differential privacy for real-valued queries, significantly reducing noise compared to the standard G…

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

Privacy by Postprocessing the Discrete Laplace Mechanism

Quentin Hillebrand, Jacob Imola, Rasmus Pagh, Sia Sejer

This paper demonstrates that the classical discrete Laplace mechanism can be post-processed to create versatile, unbiased estimators for various subexponential functions, making it a preferred choice…

View →
cs.CEcs.AIcs.CRRecentApr 16, 2026

Decoupling Identity from Utility: Privacy-by-Design Frameworks for Financial Ecosystems

Ifayoyinsola Ibikunle, Tyler Farnan, Senthil Kumar, Mayana Pereira

The paper proposes using Differentially Private (DP) synthetic data, specifically through tabular synthesis and DP-Seeded Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), to resolve the conflict between data utility and p…

View →
cs.LGcs.NEq-fin.STRecentJun 3, 2026

Dynamic Multi-Pair Trading Strategy in Cryptocurrency Markets with Deep Reinforcement Learning

Damian Lebiedź, Robert Ślepaczuk

The paper develops and validates a novel Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) framework to enhance pair trading in volatile cryptocurrency markets, demonstrating statistically significant outperformance…

View →
cs.DCcs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 21, 2026

Intercloud: Eventual Consistency for Decentralised Economies via Chilling-Effect Consensus

Gregory Magarshak

Intercloud proposes a decentralized economic network that achieves eventual consistency and security using a novel 'chilling-effect consensus' mechanism, eliminating the need for global coordination.

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization

Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

View →
cs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 6, 2026

Economic Security of VDF-Based Randomness Beacons: Models, Thresholds, and Design Guidelines

Zhenhang Shang, Kani Chen

This paper develops a formal economic framework to assess the security of VDF-based randomness beacons, demonstrating that many proposed delays are economically insecure due to rational, profit-motiva…

View →
q-fin.TRcs.CRRecentMay 31, 2026

Strategic Users in a Priority Queue with Bulk Service on Blockchains

Donghwa Seo, Kyoung-Kuk Kim

This paper models transaction fee dynamics on blockchains by treating the transaction queue as a priority queue, providing analytical insights into how user delay costs influence fees.

View →
cs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 5, 2026

Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty

Sarisht Wadhwa, Aviv Yaish, Fan Zhang, Kartik Nayak

The paper analyzes transaction fee mechanisms in modern blockchains that use parallel execution and contingency, proving an inherent trade-off between minimizing risks for users and maximizing revenue…

View →
econ.THcs.CRcs.CYRecentJun 1, 2026

Privacy-preserving Information Sharing in Oligopoly Competitions

Yuxin Liu, M. Amin Rahimian

The paper analyzes information-sharing mechanisms in oligopolies, finding that privacy protection alone is insufficient to incentivize suppliers to share data; successful sharing requires combining pr…

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 28, 2026

Scarcity Is Not Enough: An Impossibility Result for Linear Sybil Cost Under Parallelizable Resources

Homayoun Maleki, Nekane Sainz, Jon Legarda, Igor Santos-Grueiro

The paper proves that for resources with structural parallelizability (like divisibility and transferability), it is impossible to enforce a linear cost for concentrating influence, demonstrating that…

View →