This paper analyzes 48 large, active DAOs on Ethereum and finds that common governance mechanisms like token registration, staking, and delegation systematically reinforce the centralization of voting…

The paper proposes a method using on-chain voting analysis to detect emerging partisan communities within DAOs, demonstrating that addresses destined to fork cluster together months before actual orga…

The paper designs an optimal mechanism for soliciting expensive computational tasks in adversarial blockchain environments, showing that the loss of optimality scales logarithmically with the cost of…

The paper introduces extsc{Dao$^2$}, a framework enabling secure, threshold-controlled payments from one Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) to another, supporting both traceable and anonymou…

The paper proves that for resources with structural parallelizability (like divisibility and transferability), it is impossible to enforce a linear cost for concentrating influence, demonstrating that…

The paper demonstrates that on public blockchains, the ability to dictate transaction order (ordering power) is the true source of sanctioning power, as block producers can extract value (SE-MEV) by p…

The paper demonstrates that for edge-native SLMs used in decentralized governance, simpler, intuitive reasoning (System 1) is significantly more robust and efficient than complex, iterative deliberati…

This paper analyzes the Loki e-voting protocol, demonstrating that while it attempts to solve coercion-resistance without pre-agreed secrets, it remains vulnerable to specific attacks, suggesting that…

The paper estimates the quantum resources required to break 256-bit ECC cryptography and warns that fast-clock quantum computers could enable on-spend attacks on modern cryptocurrencies, necessitating…

The paper analyzes transaction fee mechanisms in modern blockchains that use parallel execution and contingency, proving an inherent trade-off between minimizing risks for users and maximizing revenue…

The paper introduces ClawCoin, a novel tokenized, compute-cost-indexed unit of account designed to solve the problem of non-transferable compute costs in decentralized AI agent economies.

Intercloud proposes a decentralized economic network that achieves eventual consistency and security using a novel 'chilling-effect consensus' mechanism, eliminating the need for global coordination.

This paper develops a formal economic framework to assess the security of VDF-based randomness beacons, demonstrating that many proposed delays are economically insecure due to rational, profit-motiva…

The paper proposes replacing individual agent autonomy with a structured 'social contract' and institutional Separation of Power (SoP) to mitigate systemic failures and deceptive behavior in multi-age…

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

The paper analyzes transaction selection strategies in DAG-based distributed ledgers using game theory, finding that Collaborative Fee Sharing (CFS) achieves superior performance compared to Random Fe…

The paper proposes a trustless framework using dual-layer cryptographic commitments to solve the operator-gating problem in blockchain provenance trees, ensuring verifiable user attribution even when…

The paper proposes a non-cryptographic, End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V) voting scheme that achieves Software-Free Verification (SFV) by allowing voters to audit election integrity using only basic arith…

The paper introduces ACE, a novel voting protocol that achieves end-to-end verifiability and strong voter privacy by combining tally-hiding aggregation with an Audit-or-Cast challenge, eliminating the…

This paper analyzes the conditions under which Bitcoin's security might fail due to miners deviating from honest mining when block rewards decline to zero, concluding that protocol mechanisms can miti…