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~ similar to 2606.03434v1· 20 results

cs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization

Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

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cs.CERecentMay 30, 2026

To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Fei Wu, Burak Öz

The paper analyzes arbitrage competition on high-throughput blockchains, finding that while probabilistic search accounts for a small fraction of activity, it is disproportionately responsible for spa…

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cs.CRRecentApr 17, 2026

Where Does MEV Really Come From? Revisiting CEXDEX Arbitrage on Ethereum

Bence Ladóczk, Miklós Rásonyi, János Tapolcai

The paper revisits the source of MEV by proposing an extended discrete-time AMM model that incorporates price jumps, demonstrating that CEX-DEX arbitrage profits can match or exceed MEV, thus providin…

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cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 26, 2026

A Trilemma in AMM Mechanism Design

Yuhao Li, Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang

The paper analyzes the trade-offs in designing Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and proves a 'trilemma' theorem showing that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve incentive compatibility (IC), weak…

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cs.CRcs.CYRecentMar 25, 2026

From Hype to Collapse: Investigating Rug Pull Scams on Solana

Jiaxin Chen, Ziwei Li, Zigui Jiang, Ruihong He +3 more

This paper analyzes the Solana Rug Pull ecosystem by creating a large-scale, manually verified dataset of fraudulent tokens, identifying three key behavioral patterns, and characterizing the resulting…

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cs.CRcs.DCRecentApr 8, 2026

MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

Jian Sheng Wang

MEV-ACE introduces a fair ordering protocol that mitigates proposer-controlled MEV by combining authenticated economic identities, auditable commit/open messages, and verifiable delay randomness to en…

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cs.CRRecentMar 29, 2026

Ordering Power is Sanctioning Power: Sanction Evasion-MEV and the Limits of On-Chain Enforcement

Di Wu, Yuman Bai, Shoupeng Ren, Xinyu Zhang +4 more

The paper demonstrates that on public blockchains, the ability to dictate transaction order (ordering power) is the true source of sanctioning power, as block producers can extract value (SE-MEV) by p…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments are heterogeneous, lack clear autonomous execution, and exhibit poor risk…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper empirically analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments lack robust autonomous execution and exhibit poor risk-adjust…

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cs.SIcs.CRq-fin.RMRecentMar 23, 2026

Interoperability Effects: Extending DeFi Lending Risk Models to Multi-Chain Environments

Hasret Ozan Sevim

The paper empirically analyzes the impact of cross-chain interoperability on DeFi lending protocols, finding that bridge volume significantly affects performance but that increased integrations can si…

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cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in state synchronization and signature design that allow attackers to exploit payment systems for resource leakage in…

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cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing critical synchronization and security flaws that allow attackers to exploit payment systems and force merchants to subsidize compute costs.

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cs.CEq-fin.CPRecentMay 31, 2026

Tokenized but Illiquid? Evidence from Real-World Asset Markets

Rischan Mafrur

The paper investigates whether tokenizing real-world assets actually improves liquidity, finding that liquidity is highly heterogeneous across asset types and is not reliably predicted by the outstand…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

A formal framework for the economic security of DeFi compositions

Massimo Bartoletti, Riccado Marchesin, Roberto Zunino

The paper introduces MEV non-interference, a formal security notion, to ensure that composing new smart contracts in DeFi does not increase the maximal extractable value, thereby providing a formal fo…

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cs.GTcs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 12, 2026

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool

Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami

This paper models Ethereum's mempool as a dynamic scheduling problem using an MDP, showing that dynamic pricing stabilizes the system and maximizes long-run rewards, and that the optimal policy conver…

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cs.CRRecentApr 20, 2026

Capturing Monetarily Exploitable Vulnerability in Smart Contracts via Auditor Knowledge-Learning Fuzzing

Bowen Cai, Weiheng Bai, Hangyun Tang, Youshui Lu +1 more

The paper introduces FAUDITOR, a specialized, self-learning fuzzer that detects complex Monetarily Exploitable Vulnerabilities (MEVuls) in smart contracts by integrating NLP-processed auditor knowledg…

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cs.CRcs.CYcs.DCRecentJun 3, 2026

The Usefulness Gap in Proof-of-Useful-Work: An Empirical Study of Pearl's cuPOW Protocol

Abhinaba Basu

This empirical study of Pearl's cuPOW protocol demonstrates that the network's Proof-of-Useful-Work mechanism generates zero useful AI computation, instead causing economic harm and displacing legitim…

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cs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 5, 2026

Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty

Sarisht Wadhwa, Aviv Yaish, Fan Zhang, Kartik Nayak

The paper analyzes transaction fee mechanisms in modern blockchains that use parallel execution and contingency, proving an inherent trade-off between minimizing risks for users and maximizing revenue…

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cs.LGcs.NEq-fin.STRecentJun 3, 2026

Dynamic Multi-Pair Trading Strategy in Cryptocurrency Markets with Deep Reinforcement Learning

Damian Lebiedź, Robert Ślepaczuk

The paper develops and validates a novel Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) framework to enhance pair trading in volatile cryptocurrency markets, demonstrating statistically significant outperformance…

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cs.MAcs.AIRecentMay 29, 2026

Design and Evaluation of Multi-Agent AI Oracle Systems for Prediction Market Resolution

Tarun Kota

The paper evaluates multi-agent LLM oracle systems for prediction market resolution, finding that independent aggregation with confidence-weighted voting significantly outperforms single-model baselin…

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