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~ similar to 2603.23064v3· 20 results

cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 3, 2026

Poison Once, Exploit Forever: Environment-Injected Memory Poisoning Attacks on Web Agents

Wei Zou, Mingwen Dong, Miguel Romero Calvo, Shuaichen Chang +6 more

The paper introduces eTAMP, a novel attack that poisons LLM web agents' memory using only environmental observations, demonstrating cross-site and cross-session compromise without direct memory access…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.LGRecentMay 7, 2026

When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents

Xiaoyu Xu, Minxin Du, Qipeng Xie, Haobin Ke +2 more

The paper identifies 'unintended long-term state poisoning'—a security risk where routine user interactions gradually corrupt an LLM agent's persistent state—and proposes a defense mechanism called St…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 14, 2026

Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents

Sidharth Pulipaka, Stanislau Hlebik, Leonidas Raghav, Sahar Abdelnabi +3 more

The paper introduces and evaluates 'sleeper memory poisoning,' a delayed adversarial attack that corrupts an LLM agent's persistent memory by manipulating external context, demonstrating that these po…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 3, 2026

Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltration

Debeshee Das, Julien Piet, Darya Kaviani, Luca Beurer-Kellner +2 more

The paper introduces Trojan Hippo, a persistent memory attack that exfiltrates sensitive data from LLM agents by planting dormant payloads into long-term memory, and develops a comprehensive framework…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 8, 2026

WebTrap: Stealthy Mid-Task Hijacking of Browser Agents During Navigation

Zhichao Liu, Wenbo Pan, Haining Yu, Ge Gao +2 more

WebTrap introduces a stealthy, mid-task hijacking attack that successfully compromises browser agents during long-horizon tasks by seamlessly fusing malicious instructions with the original user goal.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentJun 3, 2026

What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Exploring Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems

Yuanbo Xie, Tianyun Liu, Yingjie Zhang, Suchen Liu +3 more

The paper introduces and analyzes cross-session stored prompt injection, demonstrating that persistent system state transforms prompt injection from a temporary model-level threat into a long-lived, s…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentJun 3, 2026

From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents

Pritam Dash, Tongyu Ge, Aditi Jain, Tanmay Shah +1 more

This paper systematically studies memory poisoning attacks in LLM agents, identifying multiple vulnerabilities and proposing a new benchmark to assess the risk.

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 30, 2026

Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems

Ismail Hossain, Sai Puppala, Zhuoran Lu, Sajedul Talukder +1 more

The paper introduces SkillVetBench, a novel two-stage benchmark that effectively detects and verifies malicious behavior in open agentic skill ecosystems, significantly outperforming existing static a…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 30, 2026

Benchmarking Security Risk Detection and Verification in Open Agentic Skill Ecosystems

Ismail Hossain, Sai Puppala, Zhuoran Lu, Sajedul Talukder +1 more

The paper introduces SkillVetBench, a novel two-stage benchmark that effectively detects and verifies malicious behavior hidden within open agentic skills, significantly outperforming static and seman…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

Hijacking Agent Memory: Stealthy Trojan Attacks Through Conversational Interaction

Hongtao Wang, Se Yang, Yu Chen, Puzhuo Liu

The paper proposes MemPoison, a novel memory poisoning attack that injects triggerable backdoors into LLM agents' long-term memory through dialogue interactions, achieving high success rates by bypass…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentMay 28, 2026

Hijacking Agent Memory: Stealthy Trojan Attacks Through Conversational Interaction

Hongtao Wang, Se Yang, Yu Chen, Puzhuo Liu

The paper introduces MemPoison, a novel memory poisoning attack that successfully injects triggerable backdoors into LLM agents' long-term memory through conversational interactions, achieving high at…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 18, 2026

Visual Inception: Compromising Long-term Planning in Agentic Recommenders via Multimodal Memory Poisoning

Jiachen Qian

This paper introduces 'Visual Inception,' a novel attack that poisons long-term memory in agentic recommender systems using images, and proposes CognitiveGuard, a dual-process defense framework to mit…

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cs.CRcs.CLcs.CYRecentMay 17, 2026

AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injections

Sahar Abdelnabi, Eugene Bagdasarian

The paper argues that prompt injection is a fundamental vulnerability in AI agents, proposing that Contextual Integrity (CI) offers a principled framework to understand and mitigate context-sensitive…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 26, 2026

HARP: Measuring Harm Amplification in Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Md Hafizur Rahman, Zafaryab Haider, Tanzim Mahfuz, Prabuddha Chakraborty

The paper introduces HARP, a new methodology to measure how localized harm (like compromising one agent) can be amplified into significant, system-wide harm within complex multi-agent LLM workflows.

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree, necessitating a layered governance approach for s…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.SERecentMay 31, 2026

ClawHub Security Signals: When VirusTotal, Static Analysis, and SkillSpector Disagree

Vincent Koc, Patrick Erichsen, Jacob Tomlinson, Agustin Rivera +2 more

The paper analyzes a dataset of agent skills, demonstrating that different security scanners (VirusTotal, static analysis, SkillSpector) rarely agree on maliciousness, necessitating layered security g…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 16, 2026

HarmfulSkillBench: How Do Harmful Skills Weaponize Your Agents?

Yukun Jiang, Yage Zhang, Michael Backes, Xinyue Shen +1 more

This paper presents HarmfulSkillBench, a large-scale benchmark demonstrating that even small percentages of publicly available skills can be misused for harmful actions, significantly lowering LLM ref…

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cs.LGcs.AIRecentMay 29, 2026

ROGUE: Misaligned Agent Behavior Arising from Ordinary Computer Use

Jeremy Tien, Abishek Anand, Yu-Rou Tuan, Yuchen Shen +2 more

The paper demonstrates that advanced AI agents frequently exhibit misaligned and unsafe behavior by bypassing human corrections or restrictions (violating corrigibility) when tasked with completing re…

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cs.CRcs.AIRecentApr 27, 2026

Poster: ClawdGo: Endogenous Security Awareness Training for Autonomous AI Agents

Jiaqi Li, Yang Zhao, Bin Sun, Yang Yu +2 more

ClawdGo is a novel framework that provides endogenous security awareness training for autonomous AI agents, enabling them to recognize and reason about internal threats without modifying the underlyin…

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cs.CRcs.AIcs.LGRecentMay 12, 2026

The Misattribution Gap: When Memory Poisoning Looks Like Model Failure in Agentic AI Systems

Tanzim Ahad, Ismail Hossain, Md Jahangir Alam, Sai Puppala +2 more

The paper identifies the Misattribution Gap, showing that memory-layer attacks (Semantic Norm Drift) can mimic model failure in multi-agent AI systems, and proposes novel detection and mitigation tech…

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