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~ similar to 2604.15973v1· 20 results

cs.CRRecentJun 2, 2026

Signals and Spoils: Speculative Oracle Extractable Value in the Era of Cross-Chain Interoperability

Hasret Ozan Sevim, Christof Ferreira Torres

The paper investigates speculative Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) on Layer-2 blockchains, demonstrating that predictable latency differences in cross-chain oracle updates allow for profitable cross-ch…

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cs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization

Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

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cs.CERecentMay 30, 2026

To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Fei Wu, Burak Öz

The paper analyzes arbitrage competition on high-throughput blockchains, finding that while probabilistic search accounts for a small fraction of activity, it is disproportionately responsible for spa…

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cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 26, 2026

A Trilemma in AMM Mechanism Design

Yuhao Li, Elaine Shi, Mengqian Zhang

The paper analyzes the trade-offs in designing Automated Market Makers (AMMs) and proves a 'trilemma' theorem showing that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve incentive compatibility (IC), weak…

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cs.GTcs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 12, 2026

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool

Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami

This paper models Ethereum's mempool as a dynamic scheduling problem using an MDP, showing that dynamic pricing stabilizes the system and maximizes long-run rewards, and that the optimal policy conver…

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cs.CRRecentMar 29, 2026

Ordering Power is Sanctioning Power: Sanction Evasion-MEV and the Limits of On-Chain Enforcement

Di Wu, Yuman Bai, Shoupeng Ren, Xinyu Zhang +4 more

The paper demonstrates that on public blockchains, the ability to dictate transaction order (ordering power) is the true source of sanctioning power, as block producers can extract value (SE-MEV) by p…

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cs.CRq-fin.TRRecentMar 27, 2026

PEB Separation and State Migration: Unmasking the New Frontiers of DeFi AML Evasion

Yixin Cao, Xianfeng Cheng, Yijie Liu

The paper demonstrates that current transfer-based AML systems fail in complex DeFi environments because economic value migration can be structurally decoupled from explicit token transfers.

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cs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

When Certainty Is Not Worth It: Capital Lock-Up and Settlement Discounting in Prediction Markets

Jonas Gebele, Florian Matthes

This paper shows that the pricing of outcomes in prediction markets is significantly influenced by the financial friction of delayed settlement, quantifying this effect using an annualized settlement…

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q-fin.GNcs.CRq-fin.RMRecentMar 23, 2026

Financial Dynamics and Interconnected Risk of Liquid Restaking

Hasret Ozan Sevim, Christof Ferreira Torres

This paper analyzes the revenue drivers and interconnected risks of liquid restaking protocols, finding that while multi-blockchain expansion is key for adoption, the current bridge risk does not pose…

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q-fin.GNcs.CRRecentApr 30, 2026

The Satoshi Overhang: Why the Bear Case is Bounded

Karl T. Ulrich

The paper analyzes the potential market impact of a large, unknown Bitcoin holder (the Satoshi overhang) and concludes that the mechanical downside risk is bounded, suggesting the terminal states are…

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cs.CRcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

A formal framework for the economic security of DeFi compositions

Massimo Bartoletti, Riccado Marchesin, Roberto Zunino

The paper introduces MEV non-interference, a formal security notion, to ensure that composing new smart contracts in DeFi does not increase the maximal extractable value, thereby providing a formal fo…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments are heterogeneous, lack clear autonomous execution, and exhibit poor risk…

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cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper empirically analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments lack robust autonomous execution and exhibit poor risk-adjust…

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cs.LGcs.NEq-fin.STRecentJun 3, 2026

Dynamic Multi-Pair Trading Strategy in Cryptocurrency Markets with Deep Reinforcement Learning

Damian Lebiedź, Robert Ślepaczuk

The paper develops and validates a novel Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) framework to enhance pair trading in volatile cryptocurrency markets, demonstrating statistically significant outperformance…

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cs.CEq-fin.CPRecentMay 31, 2026

Tokenized but Illiquid? Evidence from Real-World Asset Markets

Rischan Mafrur

The paper investigates whether tokenizing real-world assets actually improves liquidity, finding that liquidity is highly heterogeneous across asset types and is not reliably predicted by the outstand…

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cs.CRRecentMay 3, 2026

Chain Reactions: How Nonce Collisions in ECDSA Compromise Polygon MEV Searchers

Yash Madhwal, Andrey Seoev, Raffaele Della Pietra, Anastasiia Smirnova +1 more

The paper reveals that predictable nonce reuse by Polygon MEV searchers creates a critical vulnerability in ECDSA signatures, allowing passive attackers to recover private keys using linear algebra.

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cs.MAcs.CRRecentApr 21, 2026

ClawCoin: An Agentic AI-Native Cryptocurrency for Decentralized Agent Economies

Shaoyu Li, Chaoyu Zhang, Hexuan Yu, Y. Thomas Hou +1 more

The paper introduces ClawCoin, a novel tokenized, compute-cost-indexed unit of account designed to solve the problem of non-transferable compute costs in decentralized AI agent economies.

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q-fin.GNcs.CYcs.LGRecentJun 1, 2026

Auditing Asset-Specific Preferences in Financial Large Language Models: Evidence from Bitcoin Representations and Portfolio Allocation

Wenbin Wu

The paper demonstrates that large language models (LLMs) exhibit measurable, controllable biases toward specific assets like Bitcoin, identifying an internal feature that can causally shift portfolio…

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cs.CRcs.DCRecentApr 8, 2026

MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

Jian Sheng Wang

MEV-ACE introduces a fair ordering protocol that mitigates proposer-controlled MEV by combining authenticated economic identities, auditable commit/open messages, and verifiable delay randomness to en…

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cs.AIq-fin.TRRecentMay 27, 2026

From Knowing to Doing: A Memory-Controlled Benchmark for LLM Trading Agents on Stock Markets

Taojie Zhu, Wentao Zhao, Rui Sun, Beidi Luan +6 more

The paper introduces KTD-Fin, a novel benchmark that evaluates LLM trading agents by masking historical market data and decomposing returns, finding that LLM agents' profits are largely due to passive…

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