ArXivCSExplorer
☆☆Bookmarks🏆RSSHow to UseFAQ
Built with and by Teycir Ben Soltane•
How to Use•FAQ•GitHub•arXiv.org•
Share:

~ similar to 2605.27602v1· 20 results

cs.CRRecentJun 2, 2026

Signals and Spoils: Speculative Oracle Extractable Value in the Era of Cross-Chain Interoperability

Hasret Ozan Sevim, Christof Ferreira Torres

The paper investigates speculative Oracle Extractable Value (OEV) on Layer-2 blockchains, demonstrating that predictable latency differences in cross-chain oracle updates allow for profitable cross-ch…

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 6, 2026

Order Flow Exclusivity and Value Extraction Mechanisms: An Analysis of Ethereum Builder Centralization

Ao Zhang, Yunwen Liu, Ren Zhang, Yingdi Shan +1 more

The paper analyzes Ethereum builder transactions to show that builder centralization is an emergent property of the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) architecture, driven by specific order flow and ME…

View →
cs.CRRecentApr 17, 2026

Where Does MEV Really Come From? Revisiting CEXDEX Arbitrage on Ethereum

Bence Ladóczk, Miklós Rásonyi, János Tapolcai

The paper revisits the source of MEV by proposing an extended discrete-time AMM model that incorporates price jumps, demonstrating that CEX-DEX arbitrage profits can match or exceed MEV, thus providin…

View →
cs.GTcs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 12, 2026

Dynamic Transaction Scheduling and Pricing in the Ethereum Mempool

Fatemeh Fardno, S. Rasoul Etesami

This paper models Ethereum's mempool as a dynamic scheduling problem using an MDP, showing that dynamic pricing stabilizes the system and maximizes long-run rewards, and that the optimal policy conver…

View →
cs.CRcs.SERecentJun 3, 2026

A formal framework for the economic security of DeFi compositions

Massimo Bartoletti, Riccado Marchesin, Roberto Zunino

The paper introduces MEV non-interference, a formal security notion, to ensure that composing new smart contracts in DeFi does not increase the maximal extractable value, thereby providing a formal fo…

View →
cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 7, 2026

Adversarial procurement in blockchains

Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg

The paper designs an optimal mechanism for soliciting expensive computational tasks in adversarial blockchain environments, showing that the loss of optimality scales logarithmically with the cost of…

View →
cs.GTcs.CRRecentMay 8, 2026

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Transaction Selection in DAG-Based Distributed Ledgers

Sebastian Müller, Alexandre Reiffers-Masson

The paper analyzes transaction selection strategies in DAG-based distributed ledgers using game theory, finding that Collaborative Fee Sharing (CFS) achieves superior performance compared to Random Fe…

View →
cs.CERecentMay 30, 2026

To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains

Fei Wu, Burak Öz

The paper analyzes arbitrage competition on high-throughput blockchains, finding that while probabilistic search accounts for a small fraction of activity, it is disproportionately responsible for spa…

View →
cs.CRRecentMar 29, 2026

Ordering Power is Sanctioning Power: Sanction Evasion-MEV and the Limits of On-Chain Enforcement

Di Wu, Yuman Bai, Shoupeng Ren, Xinyu Zhang +4 more

The paper demonstrates that on public blockchains, the ability to dictate transaction order (ordering power) is the true source of sanctioning power, as block producers can extract value (SE-MEV) by p…

View →
cs.CRcs.DCcs.GTRecentJun 3, 2026

Bitcoin After Block Rewards

Junhyuk Lee

This paper analyzes the conditions under which Bitcoin's security might fail due to miners deviating from honest mining when block rewards decline to zero, concluding that protocol mechanisms can miti…

View →
cs.CRcs.GTRecentApr 5, 2026

Perils of Parallelism: Transaction Fee Mechanisms under Execution Uncertainty

Sarisht Wadhwa, Aviv Yaish, Fan Zhang, Kartik Nayak

The paper analyzes transaction fee mechanisms in modern blockchains that use parallel execution and contingency, proving an inherent trade-off between minimizing risks for users and maximizing revenue…

View →
cs.MAcs.CRRecentApr 21, 2026

ClawCoin: An Agentic AI-Native Cryptocurrency for Decentralized Agent Economies

Shaoyu Li, Chaoyu Zhang, Hexuan Yu, Y. Thomas Hou +1 more

The paper introduces ClawCoin, a novel tokenized, compute-cost-indexed unit of account designed to solve the problem of non-transferable compute costs in decentralized AI agent economies.

View →
cs.CRcs.DCRecentApr 8, 2026

MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

Jian Sheng Wang

MEV-ACE introduces a fair ordering protocol that mitigates proposer-controlled MEV by combining authenticated economic identities, auditable commit/open messages, and verifiable delay randomness to en…

View →
cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in state synchronization and signature design that allow attackers to exploit payment systems for resource leakage in…

View →
cs.CRcs.CERecentMay 29, 2026

Free-Riding in the AI Economy: Demystifying Logic Flaws in x402-Enabled Payment Systems

Shengchen Ling, Yihang Huang, Yuan Chen, Yajin Zhou +2 more

This paper analyzes the x402 payment protocol, revealing critical synchronization and security flaws that allow attackers to exploit payment systems and force merchants to subsidize compute costs.

View →
cs.CRcs.CYcs.DCRecentJun 3, 2026

The Usefulness Gap in Proof-of-Useful-Work: An Empirical Study of Pearl's cuPOW Protocol

Abhinaba Basu

This empirical study of Pearl's cuPOW protocol demonstrates that the network's Proof-of-Useful-Work mechanism generates zero useful AI computation, instead causing economic harm and displacing legitim…

View →
cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments are heterogeneous, lack clear autonomous execution, and exhibit poor risk…

View →
cs.AIcs.CRRecentMay 27, 2026

Paper Agents, Paper Gains: An Empirical Analysis of DeFi Investment Agents

Jay Yu, Amy Zhao, Danning Sui

The paper empirically analyzes the nascent DeFi investment agent market, finding that while token valuations are high, current deployments lack robust autonomous execution and exhibit poor risk-adjust…

View →
cs.CRcs.DCRecentMay 7, 2026

SuperPaymaster: Eliminating Centralized Signer Authority via Asset-Oriented Abstraction to Reconcile Usability and Decentralization in Account Abstraction

Huifeng Jiao, Nathapon Udomlertsakul

The paper introduces SuperPaymaster, an Asset-Oriented Abstraction (AOA) paymaster that eliminates the need for a centralized off-chain signer, thereby improving the decentralization and efficiency of…

View →
cs.CRRecentMay 9, 2026

Toward Web 4.0: Bidirectional Trust between AI Agents and Blockchain

Yunfeng Xia, Chao Li, Lei Li, Chenhao Zhang +3 more

The paper systematizes the interaction between autonomous AI agents and blockchain platforms using a bidirectional trust framework, identifying significant gaps in current standards and proposing a ta…

View →